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ABSTRACT 
 
 
How Mitigating Conflict and Building Lasting Peace Prevents Genocide and Mass Atrocity: 
A Ugandan Case Study for Central Africa Today 
 
by 
 
 
Hannah Krentler Brown 
 
 
The central African region is currently experiencing massive conflict, much due to the 
emergence of violent non-state actors. Anti-state rebel militia groups, predominantly located 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), 
regularly challenge the state’s supposed monopoly of violence and engage in immense 
human rights abuses against civilian populations. Various efforts to address these atrocities 
have included global governance responses such as International Criminal Court 
indictments, United Nations peace accords, African Union treaties, bilateral peace talks, and 
the involvement of international and local civil society. Additionally, efforts to abate 
conflict comprise of various forms of intervention including military, economic, legal, and 
relief intervention. Also, upholding international law, including both human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, and the introduction of post-conflict management have 
worked to address militia groups in numerous ways with wide-ranging results. Issues 
involving sovereignty, weak states, international intervention, and neo-colonialism are all 
brought to the forefront when looking at rebel militia violence in this region. The questions 
then that this study seeks to answer are: What are some non-conventional issues present in 
conflict that must be addressed in order to realize long-term sustainable peace? What role 
 vi 
does transitional justice, both at the local and international level, play in conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding? How can international actors work with local forces to respond in an 
effectively coordinated way to sexual and gender based violence, war crimes, and forced 
displacement?  
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DEDICATION: 
 
For all optimists who truly believe in and fight for a world that will one day not only 
experience the absence of war, but also the establishment of humane values and structures. 
We offer this belief in hope, not assurance, because without hope the future looks bleak. 
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I. Chapter One: Introduction   
“Peace cannot be achieved through violence, it can only be attained through 
understanding.”                                                                        –Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
1.1. Thesis Description and Project Background   
 
The central region of the African continent has faced much turmoil. It is an area where 
anti-state rebel militia groups have been particularly active. Often, these groups are 
notoriously known for committing considerable human rights violations including, but not 
limited to, systematic rape, torture, kidnaping, mutilation, and mass killing. For example, as 
described by previous Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) is the most dangerous place in the world to be a woman as rape is used daily as a 
weapon of war. An estimated six million Congolese have died in the DRC since 1996 and to 
this day violent militias and rebel organizations remain rampant throughout the country and 
region. Numerous multilateral efforts have been attempted to mitigate these groups and the 
harm they cause; however, presently many militia groups still operate and new ones 
continue to emerge causing chaos and destruction in their wake. 
Various efforts to address these issues embrace global governance responses including 
International Criminal Court indictments, United Nations peace accords, African Union 
treaties, and bilateral peace talks. Additionally, efforts include military intervention1 and all 
                                                        
1 Military Intervention: The deliberate act of a nation or group of nations to introduce its military 
forces into the course of an existing controversy either outside or within of its own sovereign borders. This can 
include the use of one or many of the following: combat soldiers, intelligence soldiers, technical assistance, 
equipment assistance, and arsenal assistance. 
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collateral damage and blowback associated with it. Transitional justice2, including law 
encompassing both human rights law and international humanitarian law, is attempted to 
thwart violence produced by non-state combatant organizations. Also, peacebuilding3 and 
conflict resolution put forth by local, national, regional, and international actors work to 
address militia violence. Economic sanctions and legal sanctions are implemented to abate 
human rights abuses and humanitarian aid is distributed to lessen negative effects. Finally, 
global civil society4 has sought to address rebel violence as seen through local and national 
peace organizations and movements, as well as international organizations and movements 
to address human rights abuses caused by non-state combatants. All efforts have been met 
with varying degrees of success and failure.  
1.1.1. Thesis Focus 
The general questions then that this study seeks to investigate are: What are some non-
conventional issues present in conflict that must be addressed in order to realize long-term 
sustainable peace? What role does transitional justice, both at the local and international 
level, play in conflict resolution and peacebuilding? How can international actors work with 
local forces to respond in an effectively coordinated way to sexual and gender based 
violence, war crimes, and forced displacement?  
                                                        
2 Transitional justice: The set of judicial and non-judicial measures implemented in order to amend 
the legacies of human rights abuses including domestic or international criminal prosecutions, truth 
commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms (International Center for 
Transitional Justice, 2013).  
  
3 Peacebuilding: Local, national, regional, and international measures targeted to reduce the risk of 
conflict, or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening domestic capacities at all levels for conflict mitigation and 
management laying the foundations for long-term peace (United Nations, 2012).  
 
4 Global civil society: Nongovernmental and non-profit collective action with shared interests, 
purposes, and values that transcend national boundaries aiming to have a global reach to create change. This 
can include, but is not limited to, both international and local non-governmental organizations.  
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This thesis endeavors to explore three issues present in conflict including sexual and 
gender based violence (SGBV), transitional justice, and displacement. I will argue that all 
three issues must be addressed by both local and international communities in order to 
ensure lasting sustainable peace for the affected population.  
1.1.2. Acknowledgement of Evident Shortcomings  
Due to numerous constraints this thesis has many limitations and I wish to acknowledge 
evident shortcomings here. While there are more shortcomings than those listed here, I want 
to note three in particular. First, while there are many more issues present during conflict 
that must be addressed beyond SGBV, transitional justice, and displacement, this thesis will 
focus on these three non-conventional problems in particular. These three were specifically 
chosen as a focus based off of on the ground observations of predominant issues that need to 
be addressed in conflict and post-conflict realities. Second, this thesis will only focus on 
local and international responses and conflict mitigation techniques relating to SGBV, 
transitional justice, and displacement. While there are a host of responses and conflict 
mitigation techniques, including national and regional responses, the focus here will remain 
at the local and international level. However, national and regional aspects relating to 
conflict mitigation responses will surface at times due to the fact that most responses are 
interwoven with others and often cannot be completely divorced. Finally, this thesis focuses 
on one in-depth case study of Uganda. Therefore, while connections and comparisons with 
other regional nations experiencing conflict will be made, nuances must also be noted and 
large comprehensive generalizations cannot be concluded. 
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1.1.3. Assumptions  
Here I wish to acknowledge certain assumptions made throughout this thesis when 
referring to specific themes or terms. First, when referring to militia or rebel groups I refer 
specifically to anti-state groups that are working against the nation state. This is in contrast 
to rebel groups who are working in conjunction with a state, such as the Janjaweed rebel 
group in Sudan. This is also in contrast to organized paramilitary groups that may be 
working with or contracted by a national government. Additionally, when referring to 
human rights abuses I refer specifically to the abuse of civil/political rights as compared to 
economic/social rights. While I fully wish to acknowledge here the reality and importance of 
economic/social rights being recognized as human rights, for the purposes of this thesis the 
focus will remain on civil/political rights. 
1.1.4. Significance and Relevance 
The timeliness of this research is crucial because violence in central Africa is at a high. 
Presently, the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan are experiencing massive internal 
displacement due to rebel militia organization violence. For example, since late 2012 the 
M23 rebel group operating in the DRC has displaced roughly 700,000 individuals.5 While 
the M23 has since been militarily defeated by the United Nations (UN) intervention brigade 
in December 2013, hundreds of thousands remain displaced and other rebel militia groups 
continue to operate in the eastern region of the country. Not only that, but the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), whose leader, Joseph Kony, is wanted by the International 
Criminal Court for crimes against humanity including rape and conscripting children, is 
                                                        
5 “DR Congo Overview,” Refugees International, last modified 2014, 
http://refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/africa/dr-congo.  
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thought to be currently located in north eastern DRC along the porous border with South 
Sudan. Additionally, on March 24, 2013 CAR rebels known as the Seleka Coalition took 
over the capital of Bangui forcing then President Francois Bozize into exile in DRC. During 
this conflict between the former CAR government and the Seleka rebels many people were 
displaced and it is thought that both sides engaged in human rights abuses. With the 
deteriorating security situation in CAR, Seleka leader Michel Djotodia acting as the nation’s 
President was forced to resign in January 2014. Catherine Samba-Panza now leads CAR as 
interim President; however, the conflict remains ongoing and continues to expand based on 
ethnic and religious dimensions, specifically between the country’s Christian and Muslim 
populations. The situation has been flagged for potential genocidal activity and since the 
conflict broke out over 935,000 individuals have been internally displaced.6 Finally, in 
South Sudan over one million individuals have been displaced due to the ongoing conflict 
taking place between different government factions loyal to the current President, Salva 
Kiir, and factions loyal to his former deputy, Riek Machar.7 According to a UN report, the 
conflict has not only displaced over a million, but left roughly 3.7 million people at a high 
risk of food insecurity and an estimated 4.9 million individuals in need of humanitarian 
assistance.8 If the research questions posed earlier are left unattended, many more civilians 
in the central African region are likely to be killed and/or displaced due to rebel militia 
groups in 2014 alone.  
                                                        
6 Ian Booth, “Central Africa Republic displaced number ‘doubles’,” BBC News: Africa, January 4, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25599019.    
 
7 “UN: Over one million displaced by South Sudan Conflict,” BBC News: Africa, March 29, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26798721.  
 
8 Ibid.   
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This study seeks to deepen and strengthen current work on non-state violence, in 
particular the work and examples put forth by Mary Kaldor in her book New and Old Wars: 
Organized Violence in a Global Era. My findings could have an impact on local, national, 
regional, and international policies regarding responses working to mitigate violence caused 
by violent non-state organizations. Therefore, not only will policy makers gain from my 
findings, but civilians affected by militia violence will also benefit. Additionally, in cases 
where parallels can be drawn, other regions affected by rebel violence, rather than just that 
of central Africa, can gain from knowledge regarding effective responses to help curb 
human rights abuses rebel militia groups engage in.  
 
1.2. Methods 
To collect my data I used a multi-method strategy relying on case study, observation and 
participant observation, formal and informal interviews, and participatory action research. I 
conducted this research in two countries: 1.) The United States and 2.) Uganda. In the 
United States I conducted interviews in Washington, D.C. and spent time conducting 
secondary research in Santa Barbara at the University of California. In Uganda I spent time 
in the southern capital city of Kampala and in a northern rural town which was greatly 
affected by the LRA and continues to work through post-conflict transitions and 
development today. 
1.2.1. Case Study 
I used the case study method to approach my work. I chose this method in order to look 
at a real world practical example of a rebel militia group engaging in human rights abuses, 
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the LRA. I specifically chose this organization as a prime example in the central African 
region because they have been active since 1987 and there have been numerous attempts by 
various local, national, regional, and international actors to abate the violence they engage 
in. Additionally, because they have been active for over two decades, there is much 
literature written both about the organization itself and about the successes and failures to 
stop its violent actions. Using this case study, I draw parallels, where possible, to other 
militia organizations operating in the region and draw some potential conclusions regarding 
what an effective local and international response to these groups is to lessen human rights 
abuses. For example, I look at other case studies of rebel organizations in the region, such as 
the M23 originating from the eastern DRC, and compare it to my findings with responses to 
the LRA. Additionally, within the LRA case study, I look at sub-case studies within it to 
understand specific responses by various actors to the violence they cause. For example, I 
look at the specific bilateral peace talks held in Juba, South Sudan between the LRA and the 
Ugandan government to understand why the talks and peace agreements broke down. 
Additionally, I look at specific Ugandan policies during the conflict, such as forced 
displacement, to understand the difficulties and nuances surrounding conflict resolution. By 
looking at these case studies, I draw more comprehensive conclusions about what an 
effective multilateral approach towards peace and mitigating human rights abuses in the 
region would look like. 
1.2.2. Observation and Participant Observation 
Due to the sensitive nature of this research topic in dealing with rebel organization 
violence and human rights violations, it cannot be expected that people always responded to 
questions in formal interviews in a way that truly corresponded with their actual beliefs, 
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practices, and taken for granted assumptions. Therefore, I used observation and participant 
observation as a vital method to gain legitimate information while living in Uganda. While 
in northern Uganda and Kampala I observed and interacted with as many people as possible 
to better understand how the effects of militia group violence is dealt with at multiple levels. 
I listened to what citizens were discussing and took notes on anything they discussed related 
to violence to understand what they believe are the best mechanisms to deal with violence at 
various levels.  
1.2.3. In-person Interviews 
The research included formal and informal interviews with local northern Ugandans to 
understand their opinions on how to best abate militia violence. These interviews are 
balanced with interviews with local and international aid workers, including individuals 
associated with organizations like Invisible Children, USAID, Resolve, Enough, the United 
States State Department, and UNHCHR. While I tried to conduct as many formal interviews 
as possible, I also conducted many informal interviews where I gathered the most candid 
and honest answers from people. Additionally, when interacting with survivors of militia 
violence I conducted informal interviews with trained social workers present due to the 
sensitive nature of the research topic to ensure I did not put the individual in any 
psychological or physical harm.  
In the United States the research includes formal and informal interviews with scholars 
and researchers who specialize in non-state violence, African conflict resolution, central 
African human rights abuses, and responses to violence. In particular, I interviewed three 
select individuals at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in order to 
gain a more comprehensive knowledge of how current intellectuals view violence caused by 
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militia organizations in central Africa and what they believe an effective response at the 
local and international level would look like to abate human rights abuses.  
1.2.4. Participatory Action Research 
While spending time in northern Uganda I worked with a local community based 
organization as a participant action researcher. By engaging in this method of research I 
worked from within an organization to help develop effective bottom-up responses to 
violence perpetrated by militia groups that are engaged in human rights abuses. By 
participating in the actions of a local grassroots organization I got an inside look at how 
violence is dealt with and began to understand how local organic responses to human rights 
violations are formed and implemented. This method differs from participant observation 
because while there I took an active role in working with the organization rather than taking 
a simple observer role. Additionally, at the U.S. Embassy in Kampala I worked as a 
participant action researcher as I supported the Embassy by researching SGBV in Uganda.  
1.2.5. Data Analysis 
All participant observation, formal and informal interviews, and participant action 
research conducted both in Uganda and in the United States was generated, collected, and 
coded into various groups according to subject matter and responses given. All interviews 
were transferred to computer Word documents so as to easily compare and contrast 
information given across interviews. Further analysis of these interviews and codes based on 
key words and phrases given by participants were noted. Additionally, all information 
collected through participant observation and participant action research was transferred to 
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computer Word documents to easily code alongside interviews for repeating trends in 
responses to human rights violations engaged in by rebel organizations in central Africa. 
 
1.3. Relevant Theory and Literature Review 
To understand the proposed study it is important to summarize and highlight key specific 
theory and literature that has greatly contributed to the understanding of militia violence, 
central Africa, peacebuilding, and conflict mitigation. 
Mary Kaldor argues in New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era that 
conflicts seen today arise in the context of autonomous state erosion, an idea that has 
significantly influenced this work. In particular, she argues that conflicts today occur in the 
context of monopolies of legitimate organized violence being eroded. In contrast to earlier 
wars’ geo-political or ideological goals, new wars’ goals are about identity politics including 
movements mobilizing around ethnic, racial, or religious identity for the purpose of claiming 
state power9. Kaldor asserts that one leading factor explaining a failure to effectively 
mitigate violence caused by militia organizations is that these new wars continue to be 
discussed in old war contexts. Rather, an effective response to new wars has to be based on 
an alliance between international organizations and local cosmopolitanism advocates to 
reconstruct legitimacy. Additionally, the excerpt below from her book offers a preeminent 
introduction to the context of this research.  
The processes known as globalization are breaking up the cultural and socio-
economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics which characterized the 
modern period. The new type of warfare has to be understood in terms of this global 
dislocation. New forms of power struggle may take the guise of traditional 
                                                        
9 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 80.  
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nationalism, tribalism or religious fundamentalism, but they are, nevertheless, 
contemporary phenomena arising from contemporary causes and displaying new 
characteristics. Moreover, they are paralleled by a growing global consciousness and 
sense of global responsibility among an array of governmental and non-
governmental institutions as well as individuals.10  
Kaldor’s notion that current conflict is inherently different than old understandings of 
war is important for this research. Looking at local and international responses to militia 
violence in central Africa, I argue that many responses fail due to the fact that they are 
tactics to address old wars in a context where new wars exist. From Kaldor I argue that 
current conflict is about identity politics.11 At best, identity politics involves psychological 
discrimination against those labelled differently, but at worst it leads to population expulsion 
and genocide.12 Kaldor points out in new wars and conflict today the classic distinctions 
between internal and external, war and peace, aggression and repression are breaking down. 
A war crime is at one and the same time a massive human rights violation.13 This new 
identity politics rises out of modern state structures disintegrating and eroding, especially 
centralized authoritarian states which can often be seen through the loss of legitimacy in 
post-colonial African states.14 In Uganda’s case, when the LRA emerged in 1987 there had 
never been a peaceful or democratic power transition since its 1962 independence. 
Incidentally, to this day the nation is yet to see a peaceful and democratic power transition. 
At this time, there was a lack of legitimacy in the country as past political leaders included 
                                                        
10 Ibid, 73.   
 
11 Identity politics: Social, political, or militaristic movements and organizations that mobilize around 
a particular identity (ethnic, racial, religious, etc.) for the purpose of claiming power (Kaldor, 123). 
 
12 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 81. 
 
13 Ibid, 123. 
  
14 Ibid.   
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brutal dictators and coup d’états were common. Kaldor argues that the key to controlling 
violence is the reconstruction of legitimacy.15 In Uganda’s case, many northern Ugandans 
do not trust the government. This lack of legitimacy could lead to further violence in the 
future and difficulty in peacebuilding.  
In the first place it is important to understand why legitimacy is lacking in many central 
African governments and why so many anti-state militia organizations continue to thrive and 
emerge in the region. Kaldor’s legitimacy argument leads into Basil Davidson’s work in The 
Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State. In this work Davidson 
explains citizenship and sovereignty in the post-colonial African context. He argues that 
ultimately much of Africa’s current problems can be traced back to Western neocolonial 
nation statism, where European solutions were implemented to address African challenges. 
Nationalistic ideals and models were imposed across the African continent by implementing 
the Westphalian system throughout independence movements as a means of liberation. 
However, in practice it was not a restoration of Africa to Africa’s own history, but rather the 
onset of a new period of indirect subjection to Europe’s history. Alien European governance 
models were placed throughout the continent, but these unfamiliar models failed to gain 
legitimacy by many African citizens and therefore new states were unable to protect and 
promote citizen interests. Throughout the liberation movement most African leaders were 
European educated, and in general shared many assumptions similar to their colonial rulers, 
especially when it came to what postcolonial governments should look like. Nation statism’s 
failure in Africa is not due to African defect, but rather to the steady bleeding of African 
                                                        
15 Legitimacy: Both consent and even support for political institutions, as well as the notion that these 
institutions acquire their authority on the basis of operating within an agreed set of rules—the rule of law 
(Kaldor, 121).  
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resources into foreign pockets. Ultimately, he argues there is a large gap between African 
governments and peoples, and until this is addressed serious conflict across the continent 
will remain. This argument within a Ugandan context was voiced during an interview in 
Kampala with an international non-governmental organization (NGO) leader. He noted that 
the most serious issue he has seen over fifteen years working in the region is the stark 
disconnect between national politicians and general civilians.16 Due to the large number of 
individuals living in rural communities and the minimal effect politics in a faraway capital 
have on them, most of the population cares little about the State but cares much about 
leaders in their communities. However, it is additionally important to note that some argue 
the world is shifting into a post-Westphalian system. Therefore, Westphalian ideals pushed 
on Africa in a world where non-state actors are becoming increasingly important creates a 
paradox that remains to be seen.  
Various actors have worked to respond to human rights abuses including local, national, 
regional, and international organizations and groups. In particular, law, human rights and 
international humanitarian law, has been called upon to address global violence. However, 
drawing on Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law: Organized Armed 
Groups, A Challenge for the 21st Century edited by the International Institute for 
Humanitarian Law, challenges to international law’s implementation are clear. To start, 
international law was created with nation-states in mind, therefore making it exceptionally 
difficult to address non-state actors. International legal theory and the difficulty of its 
implementation becomes clear in chapter five when discussing the International Criminal 
Court’s (ICC) involvement in Uganda. Additionally, calls for preventing genocide and 
                                                        
16 Confidential interview by author, Kampala, Uganda, November 2013.   
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crimes against humanity have been globally made as highlighted in Alex Bellamy’s 
Responsibility to Protect and the creation of the ICC. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is 
based on prevention, reaction, and rebuilding and points towards a protection system 
involving diplomacy, judicial measures, economic measures, peace operations deployed 
with local consent, and international assistance to help build responsible sovereignty with 
appropriate capacity. Vehement arguments against the R2P doctrine include that it weakens 
state sovereignty. However, it is argued that sovereignty matters only when it is convenient 
to begin with and what really matters is geopolitics. As seen through the example of the 
United States condoning Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda to oust Idi Amin, but vocally 
criticizing Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia to eradicate Pol Pot’s regime. R2P theory 
comes into Uganda’s case when looking at international involvement, be it the United States 
or NGOs, in its conflict. R2P is an important doctrine often noted in present day Western 
intervention rhetoric, therefore it must not be forgotten in Uganda’s case.  
Specifically in the international law and LRA context, this thesis draws heavily on 
Kasaija Philip Apuuli’s The International Criminal Court & the Lord’s Resistance Army 
Insurgency in Northern Uganda and Tim Allen’s Trial Justice: The International Criminal 
Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army. The ICC was officially created in 1998 and came 
into full force in 2002. The first major case before the ICC is northern Uganda’s situation 
where Joseph Kony’s LRA abducted up to 60,000 individuals, many of them children, and 
systematically tortured, maimed, and killed innocent civilians. [Note: The conflict’s history 
and the LRA’s involvement will be extensively depicted in chapters two and three.] Allen 
carefully depicts two realities, the legal and normative developments on the world stage on 
one hand and a highly intricate local conflict of its own on the other. Common objections 
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against the ICC include that it is biased against Africans, that it may in effect exacerbate 
violence, and that it is a spoiler in the peace process, all of which is discussed at length in 
chapter five. The ICC has confronted outright hostility from a wide range of Ugandan 
groups, including traditional leaders, representatives of Christian Churches, and NGOs. 
Even the Ugandan government, who invited the Court to become involved initially, has 
expressed serious reservations. President Museveni has since spoken out about the Court’s 
apparent racism arguing, “the ICC in a shallow, biased way has continued to mishandle 
complex African issues.”17 However, conversely the ICC has been heralded as a new global 
institution capable of ending impunity for the world’s worst offenses. Chapter five delves 
into Uganda’s specific ICC case and questions whether the ICC’s normative justice theory 
plays out in practice. 
In two different texts, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs. Peace in 
Times of Transition by Chandra Lekha Sriram and Peacebuilding and Rule of Law in Africa: 
Just Peace? edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman, 
the rule of law as an important element of peacebuilding is discussed. The theoretical 
options available are not simply prosecution or pardon, as the most heated polemics of the 
debate over transitional justice suggest, but a range of options from complete amnesty or 
truth commissions (as seen in South Africa) to formal legal prosecutions. The question then 
is not whether or not accountability can be achieved, but what degree of accountability can 
be achieved by a given country. It can be argued that pursuing justice risks a destabilizing 
threat by those threatened with punishment. Therefore, arguing that justice must be foregone 
in peace’s interest. This is often argued in the LRA case because Joseph Kony has made 
                                                        
17 “Museveni blasts ICC at UN General Assembly,” The Sudan Tribune, September 25, 2013, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48177.  
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public that he will not surrender until the ICC indictment is removed and he is granted 
amnesty. However, must governments make a stark theoretical choice between pursuing 
justice or reaching peace? “Our common sense seems to support both positions: that a 
voluntarily committed criminal act is deserving of punishment, and that the social 
consequences of applying this consequence of doing so, far from preventing future crimes, 
might cause greater social harm than that caused by the crime itself for the absence of 
punishment. It would be unjust, however, to seek merely to avoid future crimes without 
taking into account, when applying the penalty, whether the person who committed the 
misdeed deserves to be punished.”18 [Note: This will be discussed at length in chapter five.]   
When discussing peacebuilding and reconstruction this thesis draws heavily on Thomas 
Weiss’ Humanitarian Action in War Zones: Recent Experience and Future Research. Weiss 
makes it clear that there is a strong relationship between conflict and rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, and development. He explains that disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) of regular and irregular troops are urgent assignments at the end or 
near-end of every armed conflict.19 [Note: See chapter five for extended discussion of DDR 
in Uganda’s context.] Weiss’ theory that reconstruction and peacebuilding is necessary to 
create a safe environment where a non-violent climate will emerge is an extremely important 
assumption moving forward in Uganda’s case. Weiss also explains that to deal with UN 
shortcomings in dealing with conflict, the UN should subcontract out military services to 
both regional organizations and major States on the one hand and humanitarian delivery 
                                                        
18 Chandra L Sriram Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs. Peace in Times of 
Transition, (London: Frank Cass Publishing, 2004), 28.   
 
19 Thomas Weiss, “Humanitarian Action in War Zones: Recent Experience and Future Research,” in 
World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond, ed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998) 58.   
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services to international NGOs on the other. An effective humanitarian response often 
requires manpower, resources, and rapid deployment capacity available only to the 
military.20 However, while benevolence is inadequate in many circumstances, the provision 
of military support seems to have caused more problems than it has solved.21 [Note: Military 
and NGO involvement in Uganda’s humanitarian response will be discussed at points in 
chapters four, five, and six.] 
Weiss also addresses that there are three essential components that must be met before 
humanitarian intervention occurs, which for the purposes of this study will be noted here as 
three essential components that should be met before a militaristic response to militia 
violence:22 
1. Effective monitoring mechanisms in the field, possibly consisting of UN monitors 
within the military’s command structure as well as an independent political 
directorate acting on the international community’s behalf and may include 
international civil society and NGOs. 
2. Political directorate and observers must also ensure that international standards are 
respected. Allow totally free media access and other civilian observers. 
3. If after agreeing to respect internationally imposed restrictions a subcontractor’s 
forces’ behavior diverges from agreed standards, the international community must 
act as a whistle-blower and other responses must be discussed.  
 
In terms of the response to the LRA in northern Uganda, it is clear none of these 
conditions were met and therefore the response was not adequate. While after almost twenty 
years the Ugandan government was effective at pushing the LRA into South Sudan, CAR, 
and the DRC, it is clear after reading Human Rights Watch’s 2005 report “Uprooted and 
Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda, that the Ugandan army 
                                                        
20 Ibid, 32.   
 
21 Ibid, 33.  
 
22 Ibid, 37.  
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itself engaged in massive human rights abuses and drove the LRA out by also terrorizing 
local communities. For example, the government was accused of attacking an IDP camp in 
the Northern Gulu district in which over 6,000 huts were set ablaze and scores of people 
died and were arrested.23 [Note: This situation will be highlighted in chapter three.] Here, it 
is clear that Weiss’ three essential, and somewhat vague, components to military response 
were not met. The government was not held accountable and there were not effective 
monitoring mechanisms in the field. However, this also leaves a weak point in Weiss’ 
argument. There was in fact reporting on this event as both Apuuli wrote on the event and 
Human Rights Watch documented much of the abuse beginning in the late 1980s. Despite 
this and the apparent “whistle-blowing by the international community” that Weiss speaks 
of, no effective response resulted. In this sense, it remains to be seen what is to be done if 
the international community “blows the whistle” on massive human rights abuses but 
nothing is done to respond immediately.24  
Although it is beyond this research’s scope to seriously discuss regionalization, I wish to 
note here, and when discussing potential effective responses to militia violence in central 
Africa, the regionalization’s importance. Weiss discusses how important regionalization is 
because it helps to subcontract out responsibility from one state alone or from the UN, and 
seeks to contribute to legitimacy in the response. Additionally, to address regionalization I 
borrow from Richard Gowan’s “Less Bound to the Desk”: Ban Ki-moon, the UN, and 
Preventive Diplomacy. Here, Gowan notes UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s approach 
                                                        
23 “Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda,” Human Rights 
Watch, Volume 17, No. 12 (A), September 2005, 67.   
 
24 International Community: Governments, international institutions, and civil society, represented 
mainly through non-governmental organizations, acting as one cohesive community. 
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to conflict mitigation and particularly highlights his increased focus on regionalization. For 
example, by placing UN regional offices around the globe, such as the regional office for 
Central Africa in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, it makes responses to conflict more effective 
on numerous levels. For example, when the beginnings of conflict seem to be arising the 
office is much closer and makes it more feasible and faster to send an individual already 
located in the region to try and prevent further escalation. Also, by having an office in the 
region with local employees working for the cause, it gains a sense of legitimacy from the 
individuals involved in conflict. For example, if a native Congolese UN worker arrives to 
discuss diplomacy with potential Congolese insurgents, he will have more legitimacy and 
more understanding about the current situation than if a native Canadian UN worker arrives 
to discuss diplomacy with potential Congolese insurgents.  
The research discussion on what makes a potentially effective coordinated local and 
international response to militia violence in central Africa takes a cosmopolitan theoretical 
approach. Cosmopolitanism is used by many to address the ideology that all human ethnic 
groups belong to a single community based on a shared morality. This research draws 
particularly from Mary Kaldor’s cosmopolitan approach to current world conflict. She 
explains that we must move from a top-down Western diplomacy approach to dealing with 
conflict to a more cosmopolitan approach. For example, while she explains that it is true that 
those responsible for violence have to end it, it does not follow that these are the people who 
also make peace25. For example, negotiations with warlords may sometimes be necessary, 
but they need to take place in a context where alternative non-exclusive political 
                                                        
25 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 127.  
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constituencies can be fostered.26 Local advocates of cosmopolitanism are always possible to 
identify and it is important in conflict to connect local cosmopolitan advocates with outside 
support. This would then create legitimacy in the effect of dealing with local cosmopolitan 
advocates, with international organizational assistance. Noting that cosmopolitanism is no 
panacea for world conflict, and that all violent situations must be carefully considered on a 
case-by-case basis, cosmopolitanism can work towards extending the world in a more 
humane direction, or at least a less unjust and oppressive world for all.27 To sufficiently 
address violence a new global social imaginary is needed that includes a world vision where 
individuals do not engage in extreme forms of violence: “a global imaginary responsive to 
twenty-first century beliefs, behavioral patterns, and aspirations.”28 While this need for 
cosmopolitanism and a global imaginary may seem utopian at present, it is important to 
remember in the words of American writer Pearl S. Buck, “all things are possible until they 
are proved impossible—and even the impossible may only be so, as of now.” [Note: The 
theoretical discussion of cosmopolitanism and a global imaginary will be highlighted again 
in chapter seven.] 
These texts shape the argument set forth when looking at local and international 
responses to conflict mitigation and peacebuilding focused on SGBV, transitional justice, 
and displacement. However, to start understanding the conflict’s complex situation, relevant 
history and background will be laid out in the next chapter to begin the discussion. 
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27 Giles Gunn, Ideas to Die For: The Cosmopolitan Challenge, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 12, 39.  
 
28 Richard Falk, “Toward a Necessary Utopianism: Democratic Global Governance,” in Achieving 
Human Rights, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 23.   
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II. Chapter Two: Background  
When there is peace in the country, the chief does not carry a shield.  
                                                                               –Ugandan proverb 
 
2.1. Uganda as a Model 
Uganda is both unique and representative of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. While many 
characteristics classify the conflict in northern Uganda as specific only to one country, 
certain successful and failed actions taken to suppress the violence and aspects present in the 
conflict may help illuminate conflict resolution elsewhere. 
2.1.1. Ways Uganda is Unique 
Many aspects of northern Uganda’s conflict and conflict resolution process are unique 
and specific to Uganda. In particular, the historical religious aspects of the LRA and the 
clear north versus south dichotomy reinforced through post-independence political turmoil 
make conflict in Uganda a distinctive case study. As will be explained fully later in this 
chapter, the LRA’s evolution and transformation from the Holy Spirit Movement is 
necessary to understanding the conflict in northern Uganda. Additionally, the religious and 
spiritual aspect of the LRA remains relevant to the present conflict resolution process as 
many Acholi community members continue to reference Joseph Kony’s magic powers and 
spiritual possession that he maintains while still hiding out and operating in neighboring 
CAR and DRC. The religious aspect of the LRA impacts how many Ugandans, be them 
Acholi or UPDF soldiers, react to the conflict, an important unique feature often overlooked 
by Western observers. This distinction will be further expanded upon in later chapters. 
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Another unique aspect of using Uganda as a case study is the clear north versus south 
dichotomy that was exacerbated in the post-independence era of political calamity. While 
many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and around the world more generally, experience 
internal civil strife, Uganda’s case is distinctive as highlighted by numerous successive 
coups by northerners with an eventual and final coup by a southerner who remains in power 
today. Understanding the historic lead up to the country’s north-south divide, as described in 
the background in the following section, helps clarify the conflict’s longevity and 
illuminates certain actions taken by the LRA and the UPDF. Additionally, the historic 
Ugandan north versus south divide persists today as evidenced by economic investment and 
national service delivery, thus contributing to certain ineffective conflict resolution 
processes taking place.  
2.1.2. Ways Uganda is Representative 
Although many aspects of Uganda’s conflict and conflict resolution process are 
distinctly unique, certain actions and aspects may be extracted in order to aid in abating 
conflict and human rights atrocities in neighboring central African nations. First, like many 
fellow African countries and others elsewhere in the world, Uganda’s domestic borders were 
arbitrarily determined by Europeans claiming land and spheres of influence. This resulted in 
merging many different and extremely diverse ethnic and linguistic groups together in one 
nation state. This situation already contains obvious challenges to nation building and 
political equality. Europeans working to manage their colonies intensified natural ethnic and 
linguistic divisions by favoring specific groups over others. This colonial legacy and reality 
is not unique to Uganda, many other countries both in Africa and around the world 
experienced similar situations that affect the nation state to this day.  
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Additionally, as argued by Basil Davidson in his book The Black Man’s Burden, alien 
European political models were instituted across the continent. At the time of independence 
for African nations, most liberation leaders were European educated and generally shared 
many of the same assumptions as their colonial rulers, particularly when it came to ideas 
regarding what postcolonial governments should look like. Because of this situation, many 
African governments failed to ever gain full legitimacy and recognition from their citizens.1 
Therefore, a gap between African governments and their populations exist as they are unable 
to adequately protect and promote citizen interests. This reality helps explain the rise of non-
state militia violence that is present not just in Uganda, but in many other nations across the 
African continent. For example, neighboring CAR and DRC are similarly experiencing non-
state militia violence with groups engaging in mass torture, rape, killing, and the use of child 
soldiers. Therefore, a closer look at Uganda’s reality may shed light on other comparable 
situations in order to prevent certain atrocities from continuing to taking place.  
 
2.2. Basics of Uganda 
Given Uganda’s location on the East African Rift Valley and its agriculturally 
desirable environment, the region has always favored human settlement. The territory now 
known as Uganda was originally a region encompassed by various ethnic clans dominated 
by indigenous hunter-gatherers, Nilotic-speaking pastoralists, and Bantu-speaking iron-
workers and cultivators comprising various clans and empires.2 The largest regional 
                                                        
1 Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, 1st ed. (New 
York: Times Books, 1992), 12.  
 
2 Rita M. Byrnes,“Uganda Before 1900,” in Uganda: A Country Study, (Washington: Library of 
Congress, 1990), http://countrystudies.us/uganda/4.htm.  
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kingdom was known as the Bugandan Kingdom, led by the Kabaka over the Bantu-speaking 
Baganda people, and was located in present day central and south Uganda. Comparatively, 
the northern Acholi Nilotic-speaking people were organized in chieftaincies and remained 
organized in relatively small clans compared to their southern neighbors.3 British explorer 
John Hanning Speke arrived in the region in the 1860s and announced in 1862 that he had 
“discovered” the Nile’s source.4 Some thirteen years later in 1875 British explorer Henry 
Morton Stanley reached the Buganda Kingdom and began converting Bagandans to 
Christianity via the receptive Kabaka Mutesa I.5 This Christian religious transformation and 
British influence laid the foundation for the conquering of the Ugandan territory by the 
British and subsequent colonial period from 1894 to 1962. 
2.2.1. Colonial History 
After militarily conquering the territory now known as Uganda in the late 19th century, 
the British declared the region a British Protectorate. The Bugandan Kingdom was viewed 
most favorably by the British for their overall cooperation and compliance compared to 
other groups and the British immediately implemented a Protectorate wide system of 
indirect rule.6 In 1900 Harry H. Johnston, British Commissioner in Uganda, imposed a hut 
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4 John Hanning Speke, Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile, (Eugene: Wipf & Stock 
Publisher, 2007). 
 
5 Rita M. Byrnes, “Long Distance Trade and Foreign Contact,” in Uganda: A Country Study, 
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and gun tax and called upon Bagandan chiefs to act as tax collectors, effectively angering 
neighboring groups and inciting ethnic tensions.7 
From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, the British brought over more than 
30,000 Indian army men and laborers in order to aid the British in consolidating the Uganda 
Protectorate and building the East African Railway from Uganda all the way to the coast in 
the East African Protectorate (present day Mombasa, Kenya).8 Throughout the colonial 
period, the British reserved all business intermediary roles for Indians, arguing their 
superiority in efficiency, leaving local Ugandans to predominantly work as agriculturalists.  
In the 1950s the Uganda Protectorate was characterized by a slow march towards 
independence evidenced through domestic dissent regarding British colonial policies, West 
Africa’s growing nationalist movements, and Great Britain’s post World War II clean-up 
and retraction from India. British governor Andrew Cohen began preparing the Protectorate 
for self-rule by eradicating economic colonial obstacles and organizing and implementing 
British political institutions. The eruption of political parties prior to independence 
immediately began dividing Ugandans by ethnicity and religion, many parties formed in 
order to prevent the future nation’s domination by the Buganda Kingdom—the Kabaka and 
Protectorate seemed to be polarizing.9 In an alliance of convenience to defeat other parties, 
non-Baganda Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) teamed with the Buganda 
Kabaka Yekka (KY) party to win the 1961 national election and subsequently led Uganda 
                                                        
7 Ibid. 
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9  Rita M. Byrnes, “Power Politics in Buganda,” in Uganda: A Country Study, (Washington: Library 
of Congress, 1990), http://countrystudies.us/uganda/8.htm. 
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into independence on October 9, 1962 with Obote as Prime Minister and the Kabaka as the 
mainly ceremonial Head of State.10 
2.2.2. Post-Independence Political Dysfunction  
Uganda entered their independence era led by a shaky coalition between the KY and the 
UPC, a party which was precariously held together by many different ethnic and regional 
groups all vying for more resources.11 After a brief military uprising against the centralized 
government in 1964, Obote expanded the army and worked to give it a more prominent role 
in Uganda as he promoted northerner Idi Amin Dada to lead it.12 Experiencing a severe vote 
of no confidence in 1966, Prime Minister Obote turned to the Ugandan military under Amin 
to aid in consolidating his power. In effect, Uganda saw a new constitution in 1967 which 
abolished all kingdoms and formally did away with the Kabaka’s recognition, sending him 
into exile.13 The military continued to strengthen and expand with the majority of soldiers 
being recruited from the north, including the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups and individuals 
from Amin’s own West Nile District.14  
Fearing that Amin was becoming too powerful, Obote ordered the general’s arrest in 
1971; however, the informed Amin responded with a revolt and staged a coup d’état, easily 
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11 Phares Mutibwa, “Shaky Start at Independence: The First Four Years,” in Uganda since 
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12 Ibid, 37-41.   
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ousting Obote and sending him into exile in neighboring Tanzania.15 Being illiterate with no 
educational background and his sole experience in the military, Amin immediately replaced 
government personnel with military commanders and instituted military tribunals above all 
other legal systems. In 1972, he expelled the country’s entire Asian population and 
apprehended their property for the army, further crippling the already stressed Ugandan 
economy.16 Over the next seven years Amin quadrupled the size of the Ugandan army and 
engaged in mass torture, disappearances, and executions, on an estimated scale of 300,000 
people, to anyone he feared unfaithful to his regime.17 In a desperate attempt to divert 
attention from internal woes, Amin rallied the Ugandan military against neighboring 
adversary, Tanzania. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere retaliated, with his army and the 
help of exiled Ugandans united under the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), and 
took back Kampala in April 1979, sending Amin fleeing to exile in Libya and later Saudi 
Arabia.18 
A contentious national election was held in December of 1980 after various interim 
governments remained in control after Amin’s disposal. Despite the election’s questionable 
validity, the UPC party claimed victory and was led again by Milton Obote, who had 
returned from exile in Tanzania.19 Obote spent much of his time in office working to quell 
his challengers with the UNLA, made up of predominantly northern Acholis and Langis. In 
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response, former Military Commission member Yoweri Museveni and his supporters armed 
themselves and created the National Resistance Army (NRA) to fight a bush war against 
Obote and the UNLA.20 Museveni garnered most of his support from the Bagandans, who 
maintained serious negative memories from Obote’s treatment of them in the 1960s, and 
Uganda’s western region. Obote’s military struggle to maintain power over the next five 
years was arguably more devastating than during Amin’s eight year reign.21 In a last stitched 
effort similar to the situation in 1971, Obote ordered the arrest of an Acholi commander and 
fled to Zambia in July 1985 as General Tito Lutwa Okello mutinied and took over the nation 
ruling from 1985 to 1986.22 Okello, working to control the country and disband Museveni’s 
NRA with his Acholi army, ultimately failed to garner wider political power and his regime 
fell in January 1986 to the NRA and he and his army fled north to their ethnic Acholi 
homeland.23 Yoweri Museveni declared himself Uganda’s Head of State and instituted the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) as the political party of the NRA. Museveni remains 
in power today.  
2.2.3. Ethnic and Regional Disparities 
Uganda remains an extremely diverse population with over forty ethnic groups living 
together inside arbitrary national borders. As noted previously, Uganda can be classified into 
two main linguistic groups including those in the southern, central, and western parts of the 
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country belonging to the Bantu-speaking group and those in the northwest, north, and 
eastern parts of the country belonging to the Nilotic-speaking population. Within the Bantu-
speaking majority, of which two-thirds of the population belonged to at the time of 
independence in 1962, various historical kingdoms exist including Buganda, the largest, 
Bunyoro, Nkore, Toro, and Busoga.24 Those in the Nilotic-speaking group include Iteso, 
Langi, Acholi, Alur, Karamojong, Jie, Madie, and Lugbara.25  
As British officials declared Uganda their Protectorate in 1884 they regarded the largest 
and most centralized Kingdom of Buganda with the most respect, turning to them to aid in 
controlling the rest of the nation. The British did not hesitate to use the name “Uganda,” 
coming from the Swahili word for Buganda, for their new land despite the fact that although 
they are the largest ethnic group in the region, Bagandans only represent approximately 
16.7% of the population.26 Uganda’s natural linguistic divide between the Bantu-speaking 
southerners and the Niolitic-speaking northerners was exacerbated by the British’s 
favorability towards the Buganda Kingdom as ethnic tensions and rivalries intensified, 
particularly as Uganda transitioned to independence and political parties were formed. 
Throughout Uganda’s history since independence and remaining to this day, many political 
and military leaders rely predominantly on their ethnic groups for popular support.  
From the time of independence in 1962 till 1986 when current President Yoweri 
Museveni came to power through a coup, all Ugandan leaders including Obote, Amin, and 
Okello represented their northern ethnic groups who were consistently ignored during the 
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colonial era. Additionally, the Ugandan military during this time comprised mostly 
northerners including Acholi, Langi, and Lugbara soldiers. Many southern and western 
Ugandans came to resent this unequal division of power, particularly under Obote’s second 
regime from 1980-1985 when the Ugandan military viciously worked to quell southern and 
western opposition. When Bantu-speaking south-westerner Museveni came to power in 
1986, the tables of favorability turned. Presently, very few northerners are represented in 
government and in military leadership positions. Additionally, economic development 
differentials between northern and southern Uganda are drastically imbalanced and severe 
inequalities exist today as northern investment remains paltry. 
 
2.3. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
It is under these historical, geographic, and ethnic circumstances that the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) came to existence in Uganda. However, the LRA as it is known 
today represents a militia group that has significantly evolved over time. To understand its 
involvement in conflict, a look at the LRA’s progression from its beginnings is necessary. 
2.3.1. The Holy Spirit Movement 
When Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) and subsequent political party, the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986, they disposed of northerner 
Tito Okello and his Acholi army which fled north. Therefore, at the time of their coup, the 
NRM’s largest opponent and potential threat came from the north, and more specifically, 
from the Acholis. To squash any backlash or opposition, the NRA was involved in mass 
killings of Acholi people post-1986. The Holy Spirit Movement arose during this time in 
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1986 on the basis of protecting and promoting northern Acholi interests in Uganda. Many 
Acholis felt immediately neglected and mistreated by Museveni’s centralized government in 
Kampala and contended they were being unfairly marginalized and punished by western and 
southern Ugandans who remained angry at the previous northern leaders. 
It is in this stressed national environment that Alice Auma, an Acholi villager from 
Odek, near Gulu town, claimed to be possessed by a holy spirit named Lakwena. It is 
believed that this holy spirit, and other gods, reside within nearby rocks on a hill in Aware 
and that they protect the harmonious coexistence of peace throughout the Acholi community 
and ensure fruitful harvests.27 In exchange, the gods demand that community members live 
together peacefully and that they regularly sacrifice animals and provide gifts of food from 
the first harvest. When times are peaceful it is believed that there will be good harvest, good 
rain, and good health; however, when disagreements and violence erupts punishment from 
the gods will ensue. It is a spirit from this Aware Hill, named Lakwena, that Alice claimed 
possessed her in the interest of protecting the Acholi people from the NRA abuse.  
In order to amass followers to her Holy Spirit Movement, Alice Lakwena convinced 
Acholis of the spirit within her by using her magical powers to perform miracles. For 
example, people believed that if they smeared shea nut oil mixed with water she blessed on 
their bodies that they would become invisible to their enemies and that their bodies would be 
impenetrable to bullets. If individuals died despite the use of this shea nut oil, others claimed 
that it was because their faith in the holy spirit Lakwena within Alice was not strong enough. 
She traveled throughout the Acholi region preaching and gathering the trust of the Acholi 
people, often aiding in setting up small health clinics to help the wounded.  
                                                        
27 Confidential interview by author, Agago District, Uganda, September 2013.   
 32 
As she continued to accumulate more supporters, the Holy Spirit Movement turned 
increasingly offensive in order to fight the NRA. Many ex-combatants from Tito Okello’s 
disposed army joined the increasingly militaristic movement and they became determined to 
move southwards towards Kampala to remove the NRM government. However, many 
believe that as soon as Alice Lakwena and her followers arrived in Jinja and tried to cross 
the river Nile, the holy spirit left her body and her powers disappeared. Thus, the Holy Spirit 
Movement was officially defeated in November of 1987 and Alice escaped into exile in 
Kenya where she later died in 2007. Most other followers who were not killed retreated back 
to Acholiland.  
2.3.2. Transition to the LRA 
It is in the 1987 chaos of the Holy Spirit Movement’s defeat and the continuing brutality 
of the NRA against the Acholi people that Joseph Kony, directly translated from Acholi 
Kony means “help,” formed the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and replaced Alice 
Lakwena. After Lakwena’s departure and Alice’s escape to Kenya, Kony, an Acholi also 
from Odek, claimed a spirit from Aware Hill came to possess him in order to protect the 
Acholi people and continue fighting the NRA. Many believe that with the spirit coming to 
possess Kony, he, Alice, and God together represent the Holy Trinity. This gave him a line 
of direct communication with God and he received the blessing and support from the Acholi 
community elders who encouraged him to protect his people. Thus began Kony’s preaching 
of the NRA’s ruthless treatment of the Acholi population and the need to organize and rise 
against them to defend their land and their people. 
Initially, Acholis willfully joined the army Kony was recruiting and once there were 
enough preliminary fighters the LRA was officially formed. The majority of individuals 
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joining the LRA were well trained ex-combatants from ex head of state Tito Okello’s army 
and many in the Acholi community eagerly supplied the soldiers with shelter, food, and 
medication when needed. In 1988 the fighting between the LRA and the NRA became 
intensified and the LRA’s demand for fighters outgrew the voluntary supply of soldiers. 
This fighter deficit in 1988 pushed the LRA to begin abducting civilians into its ranks; 
however, initially they were only forcing one man from each family to join the campaign 
and were not yet engaging in mass abductions and mass looting.28  
After two years of fighting, in 1990 the NRM began professionalizing their military, in 
effect reducing the mass brutality of its NRA soldiers on innocent civilians and changing 
their military strategies to more counter-insurgency tactics. The NRA now worked to win 
the hearts and minds of the Acholi people in order to gain the population’s trust and 
consolidate central power. The government forces stopped openly murdering Acholi 
civilians, began sensitizing the local population on NRM agenda promises, assured 
improved service delivery, and pledged peace. As the NRA carried these ideas across 
Acholiland, much of the isolated and rural population began supporting them, ultimately 
angering Kony. Feeling betrayed by his own people, Kony began lashing out against the 
Acholi population in retaliation for their seemingly flip-flopped support for the NRA. Not 
being able to differentiate between those who supported the NRA and those who still 
supported them, the LRA started baselessly attacking and torturing Acholi civilians, burning 
huts, looting villages, raping women, and abducting children. The LRA often attempted to 
maim individuals they came across, cutting off legs so one could not run, slicing off lips so 
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one could not talk, or chopping off ears so one could not hear, allowing the person to return 
home as a warning to others.  
In 1995 the NRM passed a new constitution and the military changed from the NRA to 
the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) and fighting dragged on. The war was at its 
worst levels of violence in the early 2000s as the LRA became desperate to survive and the 
Ugandan government remained in denial at the severity of the situation. By 2004 the UPDF 
forcibly removed 1.8 million northerners from their ancestral homes and into Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP) camps with appalling conditions in order to cut Kony off from 
access to people and food. Additionally, the UPDF engaged in slash and burn tactics of 
villages and land in order to flush the LRA out from their hideouts. It was not until 2005 that 
the conflict in northern Uganda ended and the LRA was effectively pushed out of Uganda 
and into neighboring South Sudan (Sudan at the time), the Central African Republic (CAR), 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A look at what factors led to the 
successful end to conflict in Uganda in 2005 will be the topic of subsequent chapters. 
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III.   Chapter Three: Key Players and Peace Process 
If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.  
                                                                                     –African Proverb 
 
3.1. Domestic Players 
Many different domestic actors contributed to the conflict in northern Uganda and many 
remain involved today as the peace process continues in Acholiland. A closer look at who 
the key domestic players are and what their involvement was during the conflict will help 
one to understand the general peacebuilding context that now exists on the ground. In 
particular, the two main opposing parties involved in the northern Acholi war including the 
Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) will be 
discussed, as well as the involvement of local Acholi religious and cultural leaders.  
3.1.1. The Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) 
As explained in chapter two, the official Ugandan military became known as the UPDF 
in 1995 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party in power passed a new 
constitution, within it changing the name of the national army from the National Resistance 
Army (NRA) to the UPDF. Therefore, when the war in northern Uganda began in 1986 with 
the NRM government coming to power and the creation of the Holy Spirit Movement, the 
national military was the NRA. However, when the war in northern Uganda ended in 2005 
with the ultimate retreat of the LRA from Uganda the State military was known as the 
UPDF. In order to prevent confusion, from this point forward in the chapter, regardless of 
their official name at the time, the Ugandan national military will be referred to solely as the 
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UPDF. Not only was the UPDF greatly involved in the conflict in northern Uganda from 
1986-2005, they are still currently involved in the ongoing peace process and continuing to 
search for the LRA in neighboring countries today.  
In the early stages of the war in northern Uganda, the UPDF was engaged in brutal 
fighting against the Holy Spirit Movement and what then subsequently turned into the LRA. 
Much of the Holy Spirit Movement and the LRA was made up of former soldiers from Tito 
Okello’s disposed army who fled back north when the NRM came to power in Kampala. 
According to local elder Acholis the UPDF killed indiscriminately and unleashed revenge 
against the former soldiers and the northern civilian population. As explained previously, to 
combat popular northern support for the LRA, the UPDF began professionalizing 
themselves in the early 1990s resulting in many Acholi civilians supporting them rather than 
the LRA. However, during the 1990s the UPDF continued to engage in unethical human 
rights abuses including unlawful detentions and rape. For example, one individual 
interviewed explained that her experience being held by the UPDF was worse than her time 
as an abductee with the LRA.1 Captured by the LRA to be a combatant’s wife in 1992, she 
was seized by the UPDF in 1993 in an ambush. Although, rather than be released and 
returned to her home village, the woman was forced to remain in an underground waiting 
hole with other former abductees. Barely surviving off of food scraps and living in their own 
feces, she and the other women were raped daily by UPDF soldiers until Acholi Member of 
Parliament (MP) Betty Bigombe was visiting the area and discovered the women living in 
the hole. It was only at this point that she was rescued and delivered to the hands of an NGO 
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who helped her get back on her feet.2 Additionally, the UPDF was engaged in other crimes 
throughout the twenty year long war in northern Uganda.  
The Ugandan government’s formal forced displacement policy of the Acholi people will 
be discussed at length in chapter six. However, it is important to briefly mention it here 
when specifically speaking of the UPDF’s role during the conflict. In 1996 the UPDF began 
forcing Acholi villagers into government “protected villages,” the Ugandan government’s 
name for Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps.3 Individuals were at times given forty-
eight hours or less to evacuate their ancestral homesteads and were informed that if they 
were found outside the IDP camp they would be considered and treated as rebels by the 
UPDF. By the end of 2002 the number of northerners living in the IDP camps reached 
approximately 800,000 people and was continuing to grow.4 The Ugandan government 
defended the forced displacement by arguing it was a necessary protection policy. Driving 
individuals into specific locations worked as a specific counter-insurgency tactic by draining 
resources from the LRA who relied on looting villages for support. Additionally, the 
UPDF’s promise of protection to civilians living in the camps is seriously called into 
question. Despite supposed security provided for the camps, the LRA continuously attacked 
IDP camps and continued to kill and abduct civilians. For example, one of the largest attacks 
occurred on February 21, 2004 in the Barlonyo camp where 330 IDPs were killed by an 
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LRA attack.5 UPDF soldiers supposedly protecting the camps not only failed to prevent 
LRA attacks, but some also engaged in rape and other sexual violence against IDPs. This is 
highlighted in a UNICEF report from June 15, 2005 which noted that the most common 
form of violence in the Pabbo IDP camp was rape, mostly by UPDF soldiers.6 These 
examples underscore that the UPDF’s protection of IDPs living in camps was weak at best. 
Besides the protection of civilians, the UPDF played a role in the conflict by engaging in 
specific military plans to defeat the LRA and drive them out of the North. 
In 2002 the UPDF launched Operation Iron Fist, a military campaign aimed at attacking 
LRA hideouts and camps to defeat the LRA who were then operating from southern Sudan 
and continuing their assaults on northern Uganda. However, this campaign unfortunately led 
to the LRA abandoning their Sudanese bases and arriving back in Uganda in full force, 
ramping up their abductions, killings, and lootings against northern civilians and even 
spreading their insurgency to regions previously not affected by the LRA.7 Following many 
diplomatic initiatives and attempts at peace negotiations which failed due to mutual distrust 
and skepticism, as will be discussed in depth later in this chapter, the UPDF continued to 
work to fight off the LRA through military means and push them out of Uganda. By the end 
of 2005, with the culmination of other contributing factors that will be noted in this chapter 
as well, the UPDF had effectively driven the LRA out of northern Uganda. Although, it 
should be recognized that the UPDF continues to search and to try to defeat the militia group 
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today as they move through the jungles of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  
3.1.2. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
While the evolution of the LRA stemming from Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement 
was investigated in chapter two, a closer look at the militia group’s actions during the 
conflict in northern Uganda is necessary to understand the specific case and peace process in 
the country after the war ended. According to international humanitarian law that outlines 
the laws of war, the situation in northern Uganda is categorized as an internal armed 
conflict. Therefore the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Second Additional Protocol of 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions, and customary international humanitarian law all apply to 
it.8 Under these laws, both the UPDF and the LRA are prohibited from any attacks against 
civilians and each party is required to treat all those whom they have in detention humanely. 
As part of the United Nations and a member of the African Union, the Ugandan government 
is technically bound as well by international and regional human rights law. On the other 
hand, while supposedly held accountable by international humanitarian law during combat, 
the LRA is not bound by international human rights law because they do not represent a 
recognized State and seemingly operate without legal consequences. Therefore, the LRA 
engage in serious egregious international humanitarian and international human rights law 
without great concern. In particular, this section will highlight the LRA’s involvement in the 
targeting of civilians and abduction, torture and mutilations, and rape and other sexual 
offenses. 
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The targeting of civilians and abductions was one main human rights abuse that the LRA 
continuously engaged in throughout the conflict in northern Uganda. In order to unceasingly 
grow their army and replace killed soldiers, the LRA was notoriously known to attack 
villages, IDP camps, and travelers 
throughout the North. Depending on 
the need for soldiers or sex slaves 
and depending on the individuals the 
LRA would encounter, the militia 
group abducted some, killed others, 
and maimed the rest to leave behind 
as a warning and example of what the 
group was capable of. Estimates of between 20,000 and 30,000 children are believed to have 
been abducted during the twenty year long war.9 Once abducted, any individual attempting 
to escape would normally be brutally killed in front of recruits to deter further escape 
attempts.10 Additionally, young new recruits were often made to kill indiscriminately in 
order to prove their courage; if they refused, they were killed. For example, one twelve year 
old boy who was abducted from a school house at night where he was sleeping was made to 
kill three civilians the LRA came across in a field. The individuals were instructed to lay on 
the ground on their stomachs at which point the boy was forced to hit them with their own 
hoes until they died.11  
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Another main human rights abuse that the LRA engaged in during the northern war was 
the use of torture and mutilation. In a grand effort to instill and insight fear amongst Acholi 
civilians and UPDF soldiers who would come across the survivors and deceased, the LRA 
would use civilian torture and mutilation to 
create sense of terror across the North. 
Abductees would often go through regular 
nonlethal beatings on a daily basis, 
particularly if militia members believed 
they were not keeping pace with the rest of 
the infantry. In a Human Rights Watch 
report one interviewee noted, “The rebels 
kept hitting my chest and my waist. They hit my chest with the butt of a gun while at the 
same time using tree branches to hit me. Up to now I feel chest pain and I was often beaten 
until I was unconscious.”12 The LRA was also known to mutilate individuals in order to 
brutally disfigure civilians in an attempt to deter northern cooperation with the Ugandan 
government. At times, people’s hands, feet, noses, ears, lips, and breasts were cut off. For 
example, if a sex slave was caught with another soldier than the one she was assigned to, an 
LRA commander may chop her lips off so she could no longer kiss anyone.13 Additionally, 
in some instances civilians were tortured and slowly killed for not informing the LRA 
soldiers where their children were hiding. For example, one thirteen year old girl was left 
orphaned with three younger siblings after she discovered that both of her parents had been 
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tortured, decapitated, and boiled in pots for refusing to give away their children’s hiding 
spot.14 
One last major human rights abuse that the LRA engaged in, despite many others that 
will not be discussed due to this paper’s scope, includes rape and other sexual offenses. 
Rather than engage in rape and sexual abuse while attacking civilians, the LRA mostly 
committed these offenses after abducting women into their ranks. In fact, Human Rights 
Watch researchers failed to document a single case of rape committed by the LRA when 
attacking IDP camps or civilians traveling in the region.15 However, after abduction many 
young and adult women were raped and gang raped by LRA soldiers and were often 
distributed as sex slaves to LRA commanders. Many of these women birthed children by 
LRA soldiers and it is believed that in 2006 Joseph Kony himself had twenty-seven wives 
and forty-two children.16 Additionally, one predominant reason that the LRA targeted 
extremely young females as sex slaves was because it is believed they had an awareness of 
the HIV epidemic. Therefore, they preferred younger girls who they believed were less 
likely to have already engaged in sexual encounters.17 
3.1.3. Local Acholi Religious and Cultural Leaders 
In addition to the UPDF and the LRA, local Acholi religious and cultural leaders were 
engaged throughout the war in working to mitigate the conflict between the two parties in 
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order to bring the violence to an end. In particular, this section seeks to highlight the 
individual role that MP Betty Bigome played during the conflict in northern Uganda and the 
role of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI). While this section will be 
underscoring the roles played by Bigome and ARLPI, it is not the intention to overlook the 
equally necessary and key roles by other local individuals and groups involved in conflict 
mitigation in northern Uganda. To investigate the full reality of civil society involvement 
during the war is beyond this paper’s reach. However, it is important to acknowledge the 
participation and compassion shown by Acholi civilians from individuals engaged in radio 
announcements working to forewarn individuals of violence, like northern Uganda local 
Lacambel, down to village neighbors taking in orphans after massacres occurred.  
Betty Bigome, an Acholi and the current State Minister for Water Resources, is the 
former chief negotiator between the LRA and the Ugandan government during the war 
through her previous position as State Minister for Northern Uganda. Under this role 
Bigombe was tasked with negotiating with the LRA in an effort to end the conflict 
peacefully in a mutual laying down of arms. From 1988 when she took her Minister position 
until 1994 when the peace talks broke down, she continuously reached out to top LRA rebel 
leaders to bring them and government ministers together face-to-face to discuss a peaceful 
end to the violence. On the November 25, 1993, within the context of an agreed upon 
ceasefire, middle ranking officers from the LRA, Acholi community elders, and government 
representatives met at Pagik in Gulu District to start negotiations.18 During these peace talks, 
the LRA demanded general amnesty for all combatants and made clear that they did not 
want to be seen as “rebels” who were “surrendering,” but rather “people” who were 
                                                        
18 Billie O’Kadameri, “LRA/Government Negotiations 1993-1994,” Conciliation Resources, 2002, 
http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/lra-government-negotiations-1993-94-2002.   
 44 
“returning home.”19 Peace negotiations continued and on January 11, 1994 all parties met 
again, including LRA leader Joseph Kony himself. Included in these talks, Kony requested 
time and a longer ceasefire to regroup his members in order to peacefully come out of the 
bush to receive amnesty. The peace negotiations began to deteriorate as UPDF and LRA 
leaders seemed to have a mutual disrespect for each other. Additionally, Bigome noted that 
she never felt like she had strong support from the Ugandan government for the talks in the 
first place.20 Despite the serious tension, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the LRA 
and the UPDF on February 2, 1994. However, while visiting Gulu four days later on 
February 6, President Museveni made a public speech explaining that the LRA had taken 
advantage of the talks and continued to kill their own people. He announced a public 
ultimatum to the LRA saying that they had seven days to surrender or otherwise face the 
Ugandan military.21 The LRA did not surrender, but rather set up permanent bases in 
southern Sudan and began attacking northern villagers once more, thus completely 
destroying any further prospects for a peace agreement. Bigombe continued to maintain 
contact with the LRA in hopes that the talks would be revived; however, after two years of 
renewed attempts Bigombe was defeated in parliamentary elections in 1996 and left her 
government position.  
Another prominent domestic player in the peace efforts during the conflict in northern 
Uganda was the ARLPI. Formed in 1997, the ARLPI was a forum that brought together both 
Christian, predominantly Anglicans and Catholics, and Muslim leaders in northern Uganda 
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to discuss the possibility of building peace throughout the region.22 According to the 
organization’s mission statement, they are “an interfaith organization that works for peace 
and development by transforming violent conflict through dialogue, negotiation, mediation 
and reconciliation in order to promote sustainable peacebuilding and development in 
Northern Uganda.”23 During the conflict, ARLPI leaders would visit with both UPDF and 
LRA commanders in order to push for a peaceful resolution to end the violence and acted as 
mutually trusted mediators between the two parties. For example, key ARLPI religious 
leaders were invited to speak with President Museveni in July 2002 and given authorization 
to work as contacts between the UPDF and the LRA.24 Additionally, throughout the Juba 
Peace Talks, which will be discussed later in this chapter, ARLPI members often acted as 
advisors and important observers to the peace process. Other NGOs and civil society 
organizations noted the importance of local Acholi religious and cultural leaders in working 
towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict. For example, one Save the Children officer 
working in Uganda during the conflict explained, “Cultural leaders have the advantages of 
reaching all the people including the rebels quicker. The fibre of the people is embedded on 
the cultural leadership. They listen more to [them] than to the politicians. The cultural 
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leaders should be facilitated and involved in peace talks. Where government tries to do 
things without them they miss 70% of the success.”25 
 
3.2. International Involvement 
Besides the plethora of domestic players engaged in the conflict in northern Uganda, 
international involvement did occur albeit on various levels. In 2003 then United Nations 
(UN) Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, commented that it 
was a “moral outrage” and explained “I cannot find any other part of the world that is having 
an emergency on the scale of Uganda, that is getting such little international attention.”26 
The UN played little to no role in working to end the conflict in northern Uganda and the 
UN’s Security Council failed to put Uganda on its agenda and pass a resolution in an effort 
to reduce the violence taking place.27 The Ugandan ambassador to the UN would at times try 
to downplay the harsh reality that existed on the ground in Uganda by arguing that more 
international attention would simply give more credibility and notoriety to the LRA rebel 
group and that the conflict was an internal issue that must be handled by the Ugandan 
military.28 However, despite the UN’s noninvolvement other international governments and 
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groups did play a significant role. In particular, Sudan and South Sudan, the United States, 
and international NGOs greatly influenced the conflict in northern Uganda.  
3.2.1. Sudan and South Sudan 
Both Sudan and South Sudan played significant roles in the conflict in northern Uganda. 
Although South Sudan did not become an independent state until July 9, 2011, it has been 
relatively autonomous since July 9, 2005. Prior to 2005 it was operating under the auspices 
of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA. Until 2005, Sudan had been engaged in civil 
war on and off since 1955. In 1956 Sudan officially gained independence from Britain 
creating a unified Sudan.29 However, when the northern government failed to incorporate 
the South sufficiently and tried to create a Muslim Arab state, African Christian southerners 
retaliated leading to a seventeen year long civil war ending in 197230. In 1983 civil war 
broke out again after the northern government declared an all Sudanese Islamic state. In 
1989 as the civil war raged on, a military coup led by Omar al-Bashir took over power. After 
twenty two years of fighting, over two million deaths, and over four million southern 
Sudanese displaced, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the 
North and the South in 2005.31 Throughout the Second Sudanese civil war, both sides were 
engaged in supporting proxies in the ongoing conflict in northern Uganda, largely affecting 
the situation south of their border.  
                                                        
29 Bamber Gascoigne, “History of The Sudan,” in History World, last modified 2001, 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=aa86.  
 
30 Ibid.   
 
31 Ibid.   
 
 48 
Omar al-Bashir’s government in Sudan has been accused throughout the conflict in 
northern Uganda of supporting the LRA both financially and militarily by arming the group 
with more sophisticated weapons.32 Since 1996, the LRA had been setting up bases in South 
Sudan in which they could easily cross over the border to attack parts of northern Uganda. It 
is also believed that receiving support from al-Bashir was a contributing reason why the 
1994 Bigombe initiated peace talks failed.33 Prior to receiving assistance, the LRA stood no 
chance of a military victory over the UPDF. However, with backing from the Sudanese State 
they would be able to continue engaging in aggressive combat. In 2004, two years after the 
Sudanese government declared they had stopped giving weapons to the LRA, Ugandan MPs 
and returned LRA soldiers accused al-Bashir of continuing Sudan’s assistance.34 Although it 
is often generally accepted that Sudan stopped assisting the LRA in 2005 after they signed 
the CPA with South Sudan, there continues to be accusations made today that al-Bashir’s 
regime still supports the group by providing money and refuge within their borders.35 In one 
interview a large NGO representative working on LRA issues noted that people should not 
be so quick to believe the LRA are no longer getting any help from foreign and regional 
governments such as Sudan.36 He commented, “Someone is still supporting them and 
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offering them a place to go when they need help. Darfur is a safe space for them.”37 On the 
other side of the conflict, the SPLA was not complacent in receiving support from the 
Ugandan State.  
During the time al-Bashir’s government in Khartoum was supporting the LRA in the 
conflict in northern Uganda, President Museveni’s government in Uganda was accused of 
supporting the SPLA operating in southern Sudan against the Sudanese State.38 In 2012 the 
Uganda government publically admitted, for the first time, to supporting SPLA activities 
during Sudan’s Second Civil War. The Ugandan State Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked 
that he “was proud of [his country’s] contribution to the creation of a South Sudanese 
State.”39 The full extent of the relationship between the SPLA and the Ugandan government 
remains unclear, suggestions range from Uganda’s simple moral support for the group to 
strong financial and direct military backing.40 For example, President Museveni claims that 
the support was moral and that Uganda offered humanitarian assistance to the SPLA and 
south Sudanese civilians.41 However, others, like the Sudanese government, argue that the 
UPDF was involved in direct military missions aiding the SPLA against the Sudanese 
military.42 Whatever the level of assistance, it is clear that the Ugandan State was aligned 
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with the SPLA and the Sudanese State was aligned with the LRA. The CPA, signed in 2005 
between Sudan and the SPLA and effectively giving the SPLA autonomy over South Sudan, 
is arguably a contributing factor to why it was the year 2005 that the LRA was ultimately 
pushed out of northern Uganda as support for each side was considerably diminished. 
3.2.2. The United States 
The United States was also involved in the conflict in northern Uganda and continues to 
remain involved today as the LRA remains at large in neighboring central African countries. 
The United States was involved in numerous ways during the war in northern Uganda 
including militarily as well as working through conflict resolution and development 
channels. In particular, the United States became more involved in the Ugandan conflict 
after the situation became more internationalized in the early 2000s. As political scientist 
and Uganda expert Sandrine Perrot puts it, there was “a major shift in Uganda’s diplomatic 
landscape” when the conflict in northern Uganda became internationalized and attention 
shifted “from ‘invisible children’ to highly visible teenagers.”43 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York City and the 
Pentagon near Washington, D.C., in December 2001 the United States added the LRA to its 
Terrorist Exclusion List. According to the United States government this list was created to 
protect the safety of the United States and its citizens.44 After this inclusion, the United 
States Department of Defense (DOD) backed the Ugandan government’s military operation 
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against the LRA and later subsequently established the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn 
of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in 2002 headquartered in Djibouti.45 On the basis of expanding their 
counterterrorism agenda, the DOD created the CJTF-HoA with the mission to “defeat 
violent extremist organizations, conduct focused military-to-military engagement to 
strengthen East African partner national militaries, and conduct crisis response and 
personnel recovery.”46 Through the CJTF-HoA the United States military helped, and 
continues to help today, train UPDF soldiers. Today, some of these soldiers are being trained 
for combat with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), while others are being 
trained to fight and hunt down the LRA in neighboring CAR and DRC. Besides being 
involved in Uganda militarily during the conflict in the North, the United States was also 
involved in conflict resolution and development practices. 
Both U.S. State and non-state actors were involved in the mediation process between the 
LRA and the Ugandan government. For example, former United States President Jimmy 
Carter was asked in 1999 with his Conflict Resolution Program to work and rebuild 
diplomatic relations between the Ugandan and Sudanese States in hopes of stopping the 
resource flow to the LRA and forcing them to the negotiation table.47 Additionally, the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) worked to try and contact top 
LRA leadership in hopes of negotiations.48 At the same time, USAID supported the 
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Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) in order to advise the Ugandan government on 
conflict resolution in 2004, before the violence in the North ended. Throughout this time, 
USAID was also involved in supporting organizations, like the World Food Program, by 
providing humanitarian assistance to individuals living in IDP camps. However, it is also 
argued that much of the money flooding into Uganda, especially in the early 2000s, was 
wasted and lost due to corruption in the Ugandan government. According to Transparency 
International’s Corruption Percentage Index, in 2000 Uganda was ranked 80th, causing some 
to argue that rather than spend donor money carefully on reducing conflict in the North the 
Ugandan State squandered most of the money for themselves.49 
3.2.3. International NGOs 
The last foreign involvement this chapter will discuss is that of international NGOs. 
Large foreign NGOs were involved in northern Uganda throughout the conflict; however, a 
surge of NGO involvement occurred in the early 2000s as the conflict became 
internationalized. Whether contributing to humanitarian relief efforts, supporting conflict 
resolution attempts, or engaging in political activism in the United States to push legislation 
affecting the violence in northern Uganda, international NGO involvement remains strong in 
the North through today. NGO involvement in the Ugandan conflict took many forms, 
although this section will focus on the so-called “Washington Lobby,” American groups 
related to the conflict in northern Uganda but who operate primarily from the United States. 
According to an NGO representative working in Uganda, the “Washington Lobby” 
related to the conflict in northern Uganda includes Resolve, Invisible Children, and 
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Enough.50 These three American based international NGOs in particular work to push 
Uganda specific U.S. legislation, often working to increase the U.S. military component in 
the fight against the LRA, as well as working to push for more funding to support the peace 
process and development on the ground in the North. Much of the three organizations’ 
advocacy focuses on the mobilization of American youth to spread awareness of the conflict 
in general, as well as call upon their government representatives to support northern Uganda 
specific legislation. Often using mass media campaigns and college student groups across 
the country to spread their message, these three have been successful at making “Kony” a 
household name in the United States. However, whether those same individuals who 
recognize Kony’s name are familiar with what the LRA stands for or that there was a twenty 
year long war in northern Uganda is a different story.  
When posed the question, “what is the best role that international NGOs can play in 
supporting countries in conflict and what was the greatest mistake made by international 
NGOs in the conflict in northern Uganda,” answers from NGO representatives varied. 
According to an individual from Resolve, the best thing an American NGO can do is to push 
for change in U.S. policy that would support the demobilization and defeat of the LRA.51 
Additionally, he said that he thinks there should be stronger support by international NGOs 
for institution building in order to promote representative institutions for democracy. A 
different individual, from Invisible Children, noted that international NGOs can be most 
supportive by promoting an active and engaged civil society both in the United States and 
around the world that helps locals implement their projects for conflict resolution and 
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development.52 Finally, a representative from Enough noted that the biggest mistake made 
by international NGOs was not pushing the Ugandan government enough to stop forcing 
people into IDP camps.53 This practice in particular, and international NGOs’ involvement 
in maintaining the IDP camps during the conflict will be discussed and analyzed at length in 
chapter 6. Finally, the individual from Enough also commented apologetically that overtime 
international involvement in the crisis had changed to focus more on the military aspect. He 
believed that the U.S. government, and international NGOs based in the United States, 
should be more focused on pushing the peace process and peace talks in order to find an 
alternative to continued violence. 
3.3. Juba Peace Talks 
The 2008 failed Juba Peace Talks were the last time a peaceful end to the LRA conflict 
was approached. Even though the LRA was not active in northern Uganda during the time 
that the Juba Peace Talks broke down, the LRA continued to operate in other neighboring 
countries much as they continue to do so today. An analysis of the environment leading up 
to the talks, as well as a look at the talks themselves, will give a clearer picture of why the 
peace talks may have failed and what could have been done differently to have reached a 
successful non-violent end to the insurgency. 
3.3.1. Lead Up to Talks 
Leading up to the Uganda peace talks in Juba, Sudan and the SPLA had signed the CPA 
which ended the long-term civil war between the two parties resulting in a semi-autonomous 
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South Sudan as of July 9, 2005.54 Some of the main issues that the new government in South 
Sudan had to address following their newfound autonomy were related to the problems that 
the conflict in northern Uganda had caused in their country, including the presence of both 
LRA and UPDF soldiers operating in South Sudan. When South Sudan President and long-
time President Museveni friend and ally John Garang’s helicopter crashed and killed him at 
the end of July 2005, other South Sudanese leaders moved into power. These new leaders 
had a history of engaging with the LRA and were less connected with Museveni.55 The new 
leadership from Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar opened up potential space to reinstate peace 
talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government. In particular, the new South Sudanese 
government wanted to see a peaceful end to the conflict in northern Uganda because without 
consent the Sudanese government in Khartoum had allowed refuge for the LRA within its 
borders and had also allowed the UPDF to enter and attack their positions. 
In order to ensure the LRA’s commitment and involvement in the Juba peace process, 
the South Sudan government conceded four main points: (1) they acknowledged that the 
LRA had a legitimate cause (2) they noted that the Ugandan government had not worked 
hard enough to resolve the conflict (3) they promised to support the ICC withdrawing the 
arrest warrants issued for the top leaders of the LRA, and (4) they vowed their full 
commitment in making the peace talks successful.56 Realizing they had no true alternatives, 
the LRA agreed to join the peace talks. However, ensuring the Ugandan government’s 
participation was more difficult. President Museveni seemed to vacillate between whether 
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Uganda was supportive of renewed LRA peace talks or not. For example, at one point he 
noted that “I don’t think any previous overtures to the LRA have yielded positive results 
[and] I don’t think they are interested in dialogue,” yet on another occasion he noted that he 
was ready for an open dialogue with them and that if they cooperated they would have a safe 
space in Uganda, regardless of the ICC indictments.57 However, in late June 2006, Museveni 
promised to send a delegation to negotiate at the Juba peace talks, despite the fact that the 
LRA had not been attacking northern Uganda since 2005.  
3.3.2. Ultimate Breakdown 
The peace talks officially started on July 14, 2006 in Juba, South Sudan. The talks 
progressed and after much disagreement, the LRA and the Ugandan government signed a 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in August of that year.58 All seemed on track till 
Sudanese President al-Bashir publically stated, while visiting Juba to celebrate the CPA’s 
second year anniversary, “We are prepared to constitute a joint force to eliminate the LRA. 
We do not want them.”59 This considerably angered the LRA and they refused to re-sign the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that was expiring in February 2007 and they refused to 
send their delegation to continue the talks after the Christmas holiday.60 Therefore, by the 
end of 2006 an LRA leader and the head negotiator, Vincent Otti, announced that the LRA 
would not rejoin peace talks.  
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However, due to tireless efforts by other sub-Saharan African nations including South 
Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, and Tanzania, and the United Nations, the push to put the Juba 
peace process back on track continued.61 The talks ultimately resumed in May 2007 and 
many serious steps forward occurred including the signing of a “comprehensive solution” 
agreement to end the war and a formal agenda on accountability and reconciliation. 
Simultaneous, the LRA was experiencing internal militia conflict and Joseph Kony 
murdered his second in command, Vincent Otti, who was also serving as lead LRA 
negotiator at the time.62 Following Otti’s death, the talks halted until January 2008 when 
discussions resumed to a productive start. In April 2008 all that was left for the final peace 
agreement outlining the agenda was Kony’s and President Museveni’s signatures. However, 
on May 25, 2008 before he signed Kony announced that the LRA officially rejected any 
peace agreement with the Ugandan government. He went on to say that he would never turn 
himself into the ICC or the Ugandan government, he would rather die in the bush.63 
Additionally, it is critical to remember that at this time the LRA had not been affecting 
northern Uganda for almost three years. Most individuals in northern Uganda were no 
longer living in IDP camps or in fear of attack on a daily basis.  
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3.4. Issues in Conflict: Peacemaking as More 
Often when thinking of conflict resolution and peacemaking, formal peace talks and 
international or bilateral treaties first come to mind. If formal negotiations are held and an 
agreement between all concerned parties occurs, the conflict formally ends and peace is 
announced. However, true conflict resolution and peacemaking is much more. Many issues 
exist in conflict situations that must be addressed in order for true peace to be realized in a 
sustainable and long-term manner. Included in these conflict issues that must be addressed 
are sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), peacebuilding and transitional justice, and 
displacement. The below sections will briefly introduce each of these issues in the context of 
conflict in northern Uganda as an introduction to the following three chapters looking at 
each one in depth. 
3.4.1. Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) 
SGBV is almost always present in violent conflict. SGBV is often used as a weapon of 
war that can destroy families and tear communities apart. In northern Uganda’s case, SGBV 
was present during the conflict between the LRA and the UPDF in many different forms 
from the abduction of young girls as sex slaves to the targeting of IDPs as rape victims. A 
host of responses to SGBV in Uganda by both domestic and international actors have 
occurred to varying levels of success. If SGBV is not addressed through conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding mechanisms while simultaneously working to reduce other violence 
within the community, long-term sustainable peace will not be possible due to the fact that 
SGBV remains a serious problem throughout communities long after violent conflict has 
abated. Steps to reduce SGBV both during conflict and after conflict, including creating safe 
 59 
spaces, tackling corruption, and engaging in gender mainstreaming, are crucial in moving 
towards a more successful inclusive peace. 
3.4.2. Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 
Peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of meanings, practices, and actions. It can 
include anything and everything from governmental development strategies, NGO 
humanitarian assistance, transitional justice, and disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) schemes. All of these examples, plus more, arguably contribute to a 
community and a nation’s long-term peace. However, how a nation or a community embarks 
on this peacebuilding process and who is and is not included in it can seriously affect its 
outcomes and determine whether sustainable peace can truly be achieved. This section will 
focus specifically on the Ugandan government and the international community’s focus on 
DDR and ICC legal prosecution in Uganda’s peacebuilding as compared with the local 
Acholi community’s and some NGO’s push for traditional justice mechanisms for inclusive 
peacebuilding. A look at this dual narrative’s real consequences relating to the actual 
attainment of both peace and justice in Uganda will be analyzed in hopes of understanding 
the normative arguments surrounding them, while at the same time understanding their 
pragmatic effects. To pursue both peace and justice in relation to the situation in northern 
Uganda, a comprehensive transitional justice approach incorporating aspects from the 
national DDR process, the ICC indictments, and traditional Acholi justice is necessary.  No 
panacea in relation to peacebuilding or transitional justice exists, where certain direct actions 
will always definitively lead to long-term sustainable peace. However, a mixture of local, 
national, and international level responses to transitional justice and peacebuilding is more 
likely to create a holistic approach creating long-term peace.  
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3.4.3. Displacement 
At the end of northern Uganda’s twenty year long war roughly 1.8 million northerners, 
mostly Acholis, had been displaced from their ancestral homes. Some were abductees, many 
fled to urban centers in other parts of the country, a few escaped the country all together, and 
most, almost 1 million of them, spent years living in “protected villages,” the Ugandan 
government’s euphemism for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. This forced 
displacement and organization of almost the entire Acholi region into IDP camps by the 
UPDF not only contributed to the dire humanitarian situation in northern Uganda, but also 
ensured lasting hardship for a whole population. Local Acholi civilians, humanitarian aid 
groups, and international governments responded differently to the displacement and IDP 
camp reality. The effects of forced displacement did not only have consequences during the 
actual campaign, but also in the conflict’s aftermath as it continues to affect post-conflict 
reconstruction and conflict resolution today. This section seeks to discuss how governments 
and the international community can learn from the northern Uganda case when responding 
to conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. 
 61 
IV.   Chapter Four: Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) 
“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of 
peace must be constructed.”                                                          –UNESCO constitution. 
 
4.1. What is the Problem? 
Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) has strong negative physical, psychological, 
economic, and social consequences affecting all individuals living in impacted communities. 
While SGBV affects both males and females, women and girls disproportionately suffer from 
violence men inflict upon them. According to the World Health Organization, over one third 
of women worldwide have experienced sexual violence in their lifetime.1 While all societies 
throughout the globe experience SGBV and the adverse costs associated with it, regions 
experiencing conflict are especially vulnerable to high rates of SGBV. These trends will 
continue unless SGBV is directly addressed and included in peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution efforts.  
4.1.1. SGBV in a Conflict and Regional Context 
SGBV is not a new phenomenon. However, as globalization has sped up since the 1980s 
with increased international access to information technology and communications, 
knowledge of SGBV has been amplified. While SGBV takes many forms and can include 
anything from domestic violence to denying economic opportunities, rape has been 
particularly highlighted in the media as an issue that is seen throughout the world. As former 
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BBC journalist Rebecca Tinsley notes, “I have interviewed many more women in Sudan, 
Uganda and other parts of Africa, and it’s clear that their harsh treatment is not a war-time 
exception: it reflects their status in society.” 2  For example, in recent years news stories 
reporting on gang rape in India, a democratic country not currently experiencing a post-
conflict transition, has gained international reach, brought the issue of SGBV to the forefront, 
and has created a push by international civil society to begin addressing the problem. 
However, while it is critical to recognize that SGBV is not unique to conflict scenarios, to 
remain within this paper’s scope a brief look at SGBV in three SSA countries, including 
Rwanda, Liberia, and the DRC, experiencing post-conflict and conflict transitions is useful in 
relation to Uganda’s present situation. 
Rwanda, a small landlocked country in central Africa bordering Uganda, experienced a 
100 day genocide in 1994 that resulted in an estimated 800,000 individuals killed, roughly 
20% of the country’s total population.3 During the genocide the Interahamwe, the chief Hutu 
perpetrators, specifically used SGBV against their victims and survivors. In a 1996 United 
Nations report, UN Special Rapporteur on Rwanda Rene Degni-Segui commented that during 
the genocide “rape was the rule and its absence the exception.”4 The genocide perpetrators 
purposefully released hospitalized AIDS patients in order to form them into rape squads, 
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forcing them to target Tutsi women.5 Additionally, at times sexual mutilation took place after 
rape in the form of damaging women’s genitals with machetes, sharpened sticks, acid, and 
boiling water. 6  Both of these practices working specifically to destroy Tutsi women’s 
reproductive capabilities, preventing the creation of future Tutsi generations. Violence of this 
kind during conflict has obvious long-term negative consequences for the entire nation which, 
if left unaddressed, leaves the population more vulnerable to future potential conflict. After 
the genocide ended and a new government was established, both a national and international 
judicial system was set in place to address crimes committed during the genocide. While many 
challenges still remain, both the traditional Rwandan Gacaca court system and the United 
Nations instituted International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have achieved some 
success at documenting, recognizing, and prosecuting crimes related to SGBV during the 
genocide.7 Furthermore, in August 2006 the majority female Rwandan Parliament passed a 
bill on the Prevention, Protection and Punishment of Any Gender Based Violence.8 While 
SGBV persists in Rwanda, transitional justice and relevant legislation is a necessary precursor 
to civil society and grassroots work related to SGBV. 
Liberia is another SSA nation experiencing a post-conflict transition. During the Liberian 
Civil War, 1989-1996 and 1999-2003, roughly 500,000 individuals were killed and child 
soldiers were used extensively by all involved parties. Estimates of between 25% and 75% of 
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the entire fighting forces in Liberia were children. 9 In a survey conducted after the first 
Liberian Civil War, 49% of those interviewed reported experiencing at least one sexual act of 
violence by a soldier or fighter.10 In another survey conducted after the second Liberian Civil 
War, 27% of the interviewees indicated having witnessed sexual violence against women and 
7% indicated having witnessed sexual violence against men.11 The United Nations estimates 
that around 40,000 women or more were raped during Liberia’s civil war and former President 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first female elected president in an African country, wrote in her 
autobiography about being threatened with rape while imprisoned.12 Now more than ten years 
after the civil war has ended, over 200 cases of SGBV are reported every month and 40% of 
the reports are children under twelve.13 In order to help mitigate SGBV, with help from the 
United Nations, Liberia has adopted a National SGBV Plan of Action, formed the SGBV 
National Taskforce, and instituted a SGBV Unit to investigate specific issues of violence and 
establish outreach services for survivors. 14  While SGBV still remains a serious issue in 
Liberia, the creation of a national Plan of Action, Taskforce, and Unit is a step in the right 
direction towards long-term peacebuilding and accountable conflict resolution.  
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As mentioned previously in chapter one, the DRC is noted as the most dangerous place in 
the world to be a woman as rape is used daily as a weapon of war.15 According to an article 
published in 2011 in the American Journal of Public Health, more than 1,100 women are raped 
every day in the DRC, about an average of 48 females aged 15-49 raped every hour.16 
Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported that sexual violence in the DRC had doubled 
between 2008 and 2009 and warned that any gathered numbers would likely be conservative 
because of underreporting due to stigma and shame associated with reporting.17 In interviews 
with Congolese rebel militia soldiers, numerous explanations are given for why rape is used 
so often.18 Some refer to the fact that the militias operating are not properly trained and are 
not professionalized like other groups. Others explained that “raping gives us a lot of pleasure, 
when we rape we feel free” and many justify their acts by noting they were following orders 
to rape women and they themselves would have been killed if they did not comply.19 Rape is 
one of the most successful and cheapest weapons of war that is used to shatter communities 
and tear relationships apart. Often times when a woman is raped by someone other than her 
husband, her husband then rejects her upon her return to their home. Thus, when rape occurs 
on a mass scale in societies, the entire societal structure of that community can be turned on 
its head. SGBV must be one of the issues seriously addressed in DRC’s conflict or 
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peacebuilding and conflict resolution will not be successful. These few examples of SGBV 
across SSA are meant to highlight the fact that SGBV is a growing phenomenon in post-
conflict and conflict countries that must be further addressed.  
4.1.2. SGBV in Conflict Mitigation 
Conflict resolution processes rarely specifically identify SGBV as an issue that must be 
addressed in order for peace to be achieved. Often in the past, violence against women during 
war has been viewed as inevitable, some kind of collateral damage that is an unfortunate 
consequence of war. However, SGBV must be addressed in order for long term sustainable 
peace to be realized. Negative consequences of SGBV affect both males and females in 
communities long after hot conflict has abated, as will be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. Therefore, without serious consideration of alleviating SGBV during conflict 
mitigation processes true peace will not be reached. Given the fact that females represent 
approximately 50% of the world’s citizens and individuals in any particular community, for a 
society to be truly productive and peaceful there must be an absence of SGBV.  
 
4.2. Situation in Uganda 
SGBV is of serious concern in Uganda. Physical, psychological, economic, and social 
gender inequality permeates all aspects of Ugandan life. Be it unequal economic 
compensation for a professional woman working in Kampala or violent abuse for a rural 
woman living in the North, the entire post-conflict Ugandan nation is negatively affected by 
SGBV. An overall picture of gender equality for the entire country and a look at SGBV 
specifically in northern Uganda will help contextualize proper potential responses. 
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4.2.1. Uganda’s Overall Gender Equality Reality 
Gender equality in Uganda is controversial and difficult to understand: women represent 
one-third of parliament, but one in forty-nine women will die in childbirth in their lifetime; 
females represent half of university enrollment, but according to a 2011 survey 70% of men 
and 60% of women think it is okay for a husband to beat his wife.20 Uganda has made many 
strides towards gender equality; however, many female activists voice their opinion that the 
government focuses on quantity over quality. Topics including affirmative action, 
generational differences, culture, religion, and policy implementation affect gender equality 
in Uganda and must be examined in order to understand Uganda’s reality.  
On September 24, 2013 Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni declared in a speech at the 
68th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that Uganda had “already achieved” the 
Millennium Development Goal of effectively promoting gender equality.21 Media and rights 
activists quickly seized upon the President’s statement, igniting a robust debate over how far 
Uganda has come—and how far the country still needs to go—to assure women are treated 
equally in the eyes of the law and in the eyes of their fellow male Ugandans. While 
government officials may claim success in the area of women’s rights, activists believe that 
the government has fallen far short of protecting women’s rights. Uganda’s 1995 constitution 
establishes affirmative action as an instrument for correcting gender inequality: “Women shall 
have the right to affirmative action for the purpose of redressing the imbalances created by 
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history, tradition or custom.”22 Affirmative action plays a key role in Uganda in increasing the 
number of women who participate in politics and enroll in higher educational institutions. 
With the help of the affirmative action policy, women constitute one-third of Uganda’s 
Parliament and are given 1.5 bonus points when accessing university admission. It should be 
noted that in 2011 females represented 50.1% of the undergraduate student population at 
Uganda’s leading educational institution, Makerere University.23 
Uganda’s affirmative action policy for Parliament put the country at 22nd worldwide for 
women’s participation in politics in 2013 compared to the United States’ rank of 80th.24 
However, when examined more closely, women parliamentarians continue to bear significant 
inequalities. Known as the add-on system, one parliamentary seat per district is reserved for 
women in addition to regular constituent seats that may be contested by all. Although special 
woman MP seats represent an entire district and regular seats represent a smaller geographic 
region, all seats are allocated the same resources to conduct business. This severely hampers 
women MPs’ ability to travel throughout their District and adequately staff employees to assist 
them. Many Ugandans believe this creates an unfair disadvantage for woman MPs who are 
regularly criticized for failing to adequately respond to the needs of constituents.   
Additionally, many perceive culture or religion as the biggest hindrance to Uganda’s 
achievement of gender equality. One Ugandan individual representing a civil society 
organization dedicated to female empowerment noted that she believes Ugandan culture hurts 
women because a patriarchal system exists which prevents women from becoming 
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empowered.25 She went on to explain that in her opinion many misinterpret religion, in effect 
justifying inequalities against women. For example, many men use the Quran to validate 
polygamy; however, she explained that men with multiple wives existed only in certain 
circumstances and all women were treated equally, compared to some Ugandan men who 
practice polygamy and abuse their wives. Additionally, a representative from a Ugandan legal 
organization explained that practices like Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) are justified in 
the name of preserving culture and that most people act in accordance with how they were 
raised.26 Therefore, she remarked, until grassroots women are reached through sensitization 
and education, injustices will continue. Certain men, who support inflicting discriminatory 
practices on women, are not alone in their campaign, as many women reinforce inequality as 
well. One interviewee explained that older, rural, and more traditional women are some of the 
strongest advocates of FGM, citing fears of social stigma attached to noncompliance and 
reasoning that it is the younger women’s duty to continue this traditional practice. Also, many 
women activists utilize this reasoning when explaining the failure of Uganda’s Marriage and 
Divorce Bill earlier this year, which would have made marital rape illegal and covers many 
other marriage, divorce, and gender issues which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Commenting on the Marriage and Divorce Bill, a former female MP said that “women are 
their own worst enemy” and that the Bill’s failure highlights the fact that, in her opinion, many 
women MPs act indebted to their party and are too young, inexperienced, and uneducated, 
which affects how they vote.27 
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4.2.2. Northern Uganda’s Gender Equality Reality 
While Uganda as a whole experiences SGBV, northern Uganda is particularly susceptible 
to high levels of SGBV due its relative low levels of development, recent history of violent 
conflict, and high poverty rates. This section will briefly highlight the reality of SGBV in 
northern Uganda during the conflict between the LRA and the UPDF and the reality of SGBV 
in the North’s post-conflict reconstruction phase.  
4.2.2.1. SGBV in the North during Conflict 
Conflict situations, including issues like displacement, exacerbate existing violence and 
often present new forms of violence against women that can continue after conflict has ended. 
During the war in northern Uganda between the LRA and the Ugandan government, SGBV 
was a serious issue that affected many, predominantly women and girls. Both the LRA and 
the UPDF engaged in SGBV, albeit in different ways. Additionally, besides direct SGBV acts 
by both the LRA and the UPDF, very high SGBV levels existed in IDP camps across the 
North. 
The form of SGBV that the LRA predominantly engaged in was large scale abductions of 
women and girls to act as sex slaves for rebel soldiers. These women and girls were given as 
“wives” to LRA members and repeatedly raped on a daily basis.28 Additionally, they carried 
extra gear not taken by other soldiers when the group moved locations, often amounting to 
extremely heavy weight across long distances.29 As noted in chapter three, the LRA did not 
engage in large scale acts of rape while attacking IDP camps or northern villages. This 
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suggests that the LRA was not using rape specifically as a weapon of war to destroy 
communities, but rather engaged mainly in abductions, mutilations, and torture to disband 
societies. Also, many previous LRA soldiers note that Joseph Kony himself forbade rebels to 
engage in rape while attacking civilians.30 Because many soldiers were superstitious that 
Kony was aware of everything, they refused to break orders and engage in rape unless 
specifically sanctioned by an LRA commander to do so. Finally, one specific reason the LRA 
targeted women and girls was to ensure the physical production of an army base. The children 
that women bore by LRA soldiers were turned into soldiers themselves as soon as they were 
old enough to carry a weapon. 
The UPDF also engaged in SGBV, but predominantly in the form of rape. The UPDF 
usually raped IDPs living in the camps they were meant to be protecting.31 The large number 
of rapes the UPDF committed against northern Ugandan civilians is consistent with the army’s 
lack of discipline and accountability. For example, in April 2004 the UPDF increased its 
presence at the Kitgum-Matidi IDP camp in response to heightened LRA activity in the 
surrounding region. However, IDPs noted that this supposed extra protection turned out to be 
a nightmare for them because during this time rapes in and around the camp greatly 
increased.32 UPDF soldiers also took advantage of the fact that they were often the only 
individuals in the IDP camps that had money. Thus, they were able to easily entice young 
girls, and at times married women, with small amounts of food or money in return for sexual 
favors.33 Due to this kind of SGBV that the UPDF was engaging in during the war in the 
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North, like the LRA it does not seem that they were using mass rape as a direct weapon of 
war. But rather, they were engaging in rape surrounding the SGBV culture built out of the 
violent war environment. 
According to a report by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), SGBV was the 
most common form of violence that took place in IDP camps in northern Uganda during the 
war.34 Overcrowded and harsh camp conditions contributed to higher levels of SGBV in IDP 
camps compared to lower rates when individuals lived in their rural homesteads. Additionally, 
one community elder noted that the impoverishment of displaced persons, among many other 
factors as well, aided in causing breakdowns in traditional moral values leading to increased 
SGBV levels.35 Many former IDPs interviewed acknowledged a severe rise in SGBV that 
began with the institution of camps. One individual explained that many people suffered 
psychosocial trauma from being forced from their ancestral homes, from having their friends 
and/or children abducted, or from having returned from the bush themselves. She noted, “To 
deal with this trauma, some people became angry and took out their aggression on their wives. 
Others turned to alcohol to numb their memories, but this too increased domestic abuse.”36 
This relationship between SGBV and alcoholism will be further evaluated in the next section 
on SGBV in the North after the conflict ended. To further highlight the relationship between 
IDP camps and SGBV, in a survey conducted on SGBV in February 2014 in Agago District 
Northern Uganda, 84% of female respondents and 80% of male respondents said yes when 
asked if they thought being in an IDP camp during the war contributed to the high rates of 
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domestic violence in their community. [Note: An in depth look at IDP camps and displacement 
will take place in chapter six.] 
4.2.2.2. SGBV in the North after Conflict 
SGBV has serious lasting consequences and heightened SGBV rates during conflict often 
continue long after the violence dissipates. Negative effects in post-conflict communities can 
include emotional and mental health consequences, exclusion from education, detrimental 
physical health, negative impacts on children, and a continued cycle of violence, to name 
some. Entire communities, both males and females, are negatively affected by SGBV and if 
SGBV is not taken seriously and steps to address it are not built into conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding processes, societies will continue to suffer. In a topline needs assessment survey 
conducted in Agago District, Northern Uganda in February 2014, the bleak reality of SGBV 
in post-conflict northern Uganda becomes clear. 
To begin with a general understanding of the interviewees’ situations, 41% of the 
respondents are in polygamous marriages, all live in rural northern Uganda, and the average 
weekly household income is 11,295 UGX (Ugandan shillings), which equates to $0.64 per 
day. In a local organization’s 2011 survey of the same community, it was found that since 
2004 72% of the community said they  had witnessed killings, 80% said they had witnessed 
torture or beatings, and 81% said a family member or close friend had been abducted or 
disappeared. Additionally, 94% of female respondents and 88% of male respondents 
acknowledged that women work more hours than men do on a daily basis. 63% of women 
answered yes to having had experienced violence in the home and 20% of women answered 
yes (along a scale from once to more than 10 times) to having been forced to have sex with 
their spouse during the last 12 months. 37% of women and 54% of men said that the husband 
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makes all decisions in the household for reasons including culture/tradition/religion which 
says men should be in charge and women should be subservient, men insist that women are 
stupid/useless/not able to make decisions, men have more power than women, and because 
men paid a dowry for women and therefore she must obey him.  
Alcohol and SGBV have an extremely strong relationship that came across when 
analyzing the needs assessment survey results. 54% of women who indicated they suffered 
some kind of abuse from their spouse said that the perpetrator is usually under the influence 
of alcohol when abuse occurs. When asked what they believe the main causes of SGBV are 
in their community, 77% of women respondents answered alcoholism and 72% of men 
respondents answered alcoholism. When asked why SGBV increased during the time of the 
IDP camps, 29% of women said alcoholism in the camps led to domestic violence, followed 
by 22% of women that said due to the overcrowded nature of camps there was an increase in 
SGBV. In response to what do you think are the causes of trauma in your community, 43% of 
women said alcoholism while 50% of men said alcoholism. However, there seems to be a 
disconnect between these figures and the following figures. When asked how to reduce 
domestic violence in their community, only 12% of women said to reduce alcoholism and 
only 11% of men said to reduce alcoholism. This may in part be due to the fact that a 
significant number of individuals engage in alcohol brewing as a livelihood activity and it 
often is their main source of income, 20% of those surveyed said their primary source of 
income is through brewing alcohol. While these figures do not do nearly enough to truly 
express the dire situation of high SGBV levels in northern Uganda, they attempt to underscore 
certain issues related to SGBV that continue in post-conflict communities when conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding fail to adequately address the issue.  
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4.3. Responses to SGBV 
A host of responses from diverse actors have been attempted to address and reduce 
SGBV rates in Uganda. However, not all have had effective results in achieving their stated 
goals. To understand what strategies have experienced success and which have failed, a 
closer look at specific SGBV responses is required. 
4.3.1. Domestic Responses 
One policy the Ugandan government has implemented to increase the number of female 
Parliamentarians is an affirmative action add-on system. Leading female advocates and 
interviewees conceded affirmative action’s role in promoting women’s participation since 
Uganda’s independence. However, advocates claim that while affirmative action has bolstered 
women’s representation in sectors such as politics and education, it does little to contribute to 
women’s empowerment. One Ugandan lawyer and female activist explained that ideally 
affirmative action is meant to empower women to take leadership on their own terms. For 
example, she clarified that once women MPs successfully acquire affirmative action seats, 
theoretically they should then feel empowered to stand for regular constituent seats. However, 
this situation rarely occurs in practice and most women continue to run exclusively for women 
designated seats.  
At the policy level, affirmative action has certainly protected women’s rights from a 
legislative standpoint. However, many gender equality aspects have not reached rural 
women—the large majority of Ugandan women. A Ugandan NGO female activist noted that 
elite women parliamentarians are disconnected from Ugandan women’s needs. Also, she 
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explained that they continuously fail to cross party lines to unite in solidarity as women MPs 
for legislation that would empower and support the average Ugandan woman. However, while 
most Ugandans interviewed criticized aspects of the country’s affirmative action policy, all 
also acknowledged its necessity. One former female MP explained that affirmative action is a 
necessary evil giving “women more participation without influence.”37 
Another way the Ugandan government has responded to SGBV and gender inequality is 
to pass the Anti-Pornography Bill and shelve the Marriage and Divorce Bill. The Anti-
Pornography Bill, proposed by Uganda’s ethics and integrity minister, “seeks to create the 
offense of pornography which is blamed for sexual crimes against women and children 
including rape, child molestation and incest.”38 The Bill, passed in December 2013 and signed 
into law on February 6, 2014, defines pornography as “any representation, through 
publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent show, information technology or whatever 
means, of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities.”39 The “indecent 
show” words grabbed international attention when described by the minister as revealing 
dresses or skirts for women, thus in effect banning women in Uganda from wearing 
miniskirts.40 Activists argue that rather than further protect women from SGBV, the Bill 
criminalizes and blames women who, by wearing short skirts, are “asking for it” and cause 
the violation against them to occur. Additionally, Uganda’s Marriage and Divorce Bill, which 
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would have updated laws surrounding marriage and divorce and which covered a wide range 
of issues including bride wealth and female circumcision, was shelved again in 2013 after its 
initial creation in 1964.41 Clause 114, which specifically made marital rape illegal, gained the 
most attention and many argue was the main reason the Bill cannot pass. Common objections 
surrounding the Bill include that it undermines traditional and religious understandings of 
marriage and that once married, sex is a required duty. 42  These two Bills highlight the 
Ugandan government’s views and steps towards, or rather against, reducing SGBV.   
Uganda has signed and ratified the international Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol to the African Charter 
on the Rights of Women. Also, Uganda’s constitution recognizes women’s role in society and 
clearly lays out women’s rights. Uganda’s official gender policy, revised in 2007, is 
progressive and aims to institutionalize gender as a key concept in development and 
government work. In section 2.1 it states that “The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 
guarantees equality between women and men before and under the law in the spheres of 
political, social and cultural life.”43 Additionally, under the Equal Opportunities Act 2007, the 
Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) was established to eliminate discrimination and 
inequalities against all. However, despite these commendable efforts and existing gender 
sensitive policy, implementation problems and loopholes remain. For example, while the 
Equal Opportunities Commission Act exists to redress imbalances against marginalized 
groups, Section 15(6)(d) of the Act prevents the EOC from investigating behavior regarded 
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as “immoral and socially harmful [or] unacceptable by the majority of the cultural groupings 
and social communities in Uganda.”44 Therefore, cultural and historical injustices, such as 
domestic violence including marital rape and abuse, based on the majority’s conceptualization 
of morality remains. One local Ugandan female activist noted, “When policy is made, local 
actors must carry it out; however, many rural populations don’t understand and lack 
sensitization.”45 
Uganda has made positive steps towards promoting gender equality. However, President 
Museveni’s statement at the United Nations General Assembly was too bold and does not 
adequately reflect the current status of gender equality and female empowerment in the 
country. While affirmative action policies have proven to increase women’s representation 
in politics and higher education, many rural women do not benefit from gender specific 
legislation due to women MPs’ failure to work collaboratively and push rural women’s 
issues. In turn, many rural women lack political will and therefore fail to demand more 
rights and protection from their parliamentarians. This results in a cycle of inaction and 
failed legislation, as evidenced by the challenges and controversy surrounding the Marriage 
and Divorce Bill. Generational discrepancies, urban and rural differences, culture, and 
religion, all play strong influencing roles when understanding Uganda’s gender equality. 
Additionally, while strong gender sensitive policy already exists, proper implementation 
remains to be seen and legal loopholes are rampant. Although many challenges to achieving 
gender equality exist, Uganda is headed, albeit slowly, in the correct direction towards 
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eliminating imbalances. In the words of one female activist, “Uganda is going in the right 
direction, but sometimes people go to sleep.”46 
4.3.2. International Responses 
In addition to domestic responses to reducing SGBV in Uganda, international responses 
have also occurred. In particular, many international NGOs operating in Uganda engage in 
promoting gender equality and reducing SGBV. Two key activities that NGOs engage in 
surrounding SGBV include general community sensitizations and Village Savings and Loans 
Associations (VSLA). In particular, these two activities have been promoted by both large 
scale international NGOs and small local community based organizations (CBOs) across 
Uganda, and throughout the entire developing world more generally.  
In the SGBV needs assessment survey conducted in Agago District, northern Uganda, in 
February 2014, when asked how to reduce domestic violence 53% of female respondents and 
46% of male respondents said advocacy/awareness raising/community sensitizations for men 
and women on SGBV, women’s rights and women’s equality. This was the most common 
response by a far margin as the second most common response was 31% of women and 24% 
of men answering counseling services should continue between husbands and wives. In 
response to whether you are aware of existing laws addressing SGBV/domestic violence, 32% 
of female respondents and 17% of male respondents said no and 17% of women and 18% of 
men did not answer the question. Therefore, the survey’s data suggests there is both a need 
and a desire from the rural northern Ugandan populations for more community sensitization 
surrounding SGBV and gender equality. However, what should this sensitization look like? 
Most SGBV sensitizations involve NGO or CBO workers conducting workshops, teach-ins, 
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or dialogues with local community members to raise awareness regarding international human 
rights, domestic and international law relating to SGBV and gender equality, information on 
what an SGBV survivor can do, and SGBV prevention tips. One observed disconnect between 
this sensitization activity and SGBV is in relation to alcohol. For example, while there is a 
push to conduct community sensitization surround SGBV, there is less push to do the same 
surrounding alcohol abuse. However, as explained in the previous section, there is a strong 
correlation between alcohol abuse and SGBV. Therefore, community SGBV sensitizations 
must include information about alcoholism in order to have a serious effect on SGBV rates.  
Another activity NGOs and CBOs commonly engage in regarding SGBV and gender 
equality is VSLA. Organizers form local community members into groups of roughly thirty 
individuals to meet on a weekly basis. Each week a group facilitator, usually an NGO worker, 
meets with the group to mentor members about money saving, human rights, or health and 
every week each member is responsible for bringing between UGX 100 and 500 shillings 
($0.04 and $0.20), or more if they can, to contribute to the group. Every week the money is 
collected and saved until the end of the year when individual group members can ask to take 
a small loan from the collected money for entrepreneurial purposes. VSLA groups are meant 
to empower women, and thus reduce SGBV, by providing simple savings and loan facilities 
to a group that does not have easy access to formal financial services. Besides providing small 
loans, the VSLA groups also act as an important psychosocial support network for individuals 
to discuss issues they may be having within their families or community. While VSLA groups 
have proven to be extremely successful and many interviewees noted their extreme 
thankfulness at having this kind of support group and outlet to attend each week, some voiced 
that their husbands were upset at them for attending the group each week and some were even 
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forbidden from going. 47  While VSLA groups are usually open to both male and female 
individuals, most group members are female. Due to the fact that men are extremely important 
actors when working to reduce SGBV, more emphasis needs to be put on including men in 
any activities regarding gender equality.  
Many criticisms exist surrounding NGO work on SGBV in developing countries, much 
having to do with pushing Western notions of human rights and law on communities. 
However, rather than spend time discussing and addressing these mainstream and often 
unhelpful condemnations, this section will focus on less recognized NGO and CBO 
shortcomings. One of the single largest issues surrounding attempts to reduce SGBV and 
promote gender equality in communities regards problems with monitoring and evaluating 
programs. When organizations conduct community sensitizations, how can they truly monitor 
behavior change? NGOs and CBOs usually rely heavily on foreign donors to fund their 
program activities and in return for large sums of money provided, foreign donors expect clear 
results. Often, NGOs provide program results to donors through monthly or quarterly reports 
where donors can easily and quickly see what contribution their funds have on the ground. 
However, serious community behavior change surrounding SGBV and gender equality is not 
possible to evaluate over a short period. Rather, behavior change must be monitored over the 
long-term. Unfortunately, the present foreign donor/NGO relationship based on short-termism 
does not provide for long-term sustainable SGBV activities and their proper evaluation. 
Additionally, many interviewed NGO workers expressed frustration over the fact that their 
foreign donors are increasingly providing them with smaller sums of money and expecting 
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them “to perform miracles.” 48  One individual who previously worked for a large NGO 
operating in Tanzanian refugee camps noted that at one point they were expected to work on 
child protection, SGBV, and public health for all individuals living within the refugee camp 
on the same budget that they had in previous years where they were only responsible for one 
of those issues. She expressed, “At the end of the day, it’s the beneficiaries who suffer most 
and the donors think they’re getting more bang for their buck.”49 
 
4.4. A Look to the Future: What can be done? 
SGBV remains a serious problem throughout the world and particularly for communities 
suffering from conflict and post-conflict realities. While there are serious obstacles to navigate 
and setbacks do occur, optimism is plentiful and clear steps can and should be taken to increase 
gender equality in Uganda including the creation of safe spaces, tackling corruption, and 
gender mainstreaming. 
4.4.1. Creating Safe Spaces 
One common desire voiced by Ugandan interviewees was the need for a space where 
SGBV survivors could go to where they knew they would be safe from further abuse. Due to 
the fact that most rural Ugandan women are dependent on their husbands for shelter and 
money, many individuals suffering from SGBV feel they cannot escape their partner when he 
is being violent because they have nowhere to go. Some women explained that if they were 
able to escape to a safe space they would be able to return to their husbands within 24 or 48 
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hours after he had a chance to calm down and they would be more likely able to discuss the 
issue at hand without violence. These safe spaces could take a number of forms from a larger 
official shelter with many rooms to more humble rooms and/or huts that were left vacant for 
individuals in need.  
Additionally, shelters could provide much more than just a safe space for SGBV survivors. 
As shelters expand they could provide much more for individuals in need such as psychosocial 
support, health unit referrals, assistance with official police procedures if the individual wants 
to take legal action, and small meals. One main issue voiced by interviewees was the need for 
assistance in navigating options a survivor has after abuse takes place. How to fill out a police 
form and where one can seek assistance can be a confusing and overwhelming process. 
Therefore, shelters could support individuals on a more complex basis. Specific rules 
including time limits would need to be implemented at the shelter to ensure that individuals 
returned to their homes when possible. Another suggestion voiced from interviewees was the 
idea of a trained social worker shelter staff member returning with the SGBV survivor to their 
home along with a police officer to ensure that the individual did not walk directly back into 
the violent abuse. Therefore, partnerships with local authorities, including police and health 
professionals, and individuals working at these “safe spaces” would be crucial for long-term 
sustainability.  
Safe space shelters for SGBV survivors would also provide foreign donors a clear and 
tangible activity that NGO and CBO workers would be able to more easily monitor. For 
example, data including how many individuals used the shelter, how many individuals were 
helped with filling out police forms, how many health referrals were made, how many follow-
ups with returned clients were conducted would all easily fit into monthly and quarterly 
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reports to placate donors’ constant need for updates. Not only this, but as the program 
continued to grow the shelter would be able to conduct their own public community 
sensitizations on SGBV and gender equality and begin to take over larger long-term 
behavioral change activity that would ensure long-term SGBV reduction. Therefore, in the 
end, donors would be pleased with clear monitoring of the NGOs activity, SGBV survivors 
would have a safe space to go in times of need, and the community as a whole would benefit 
from increased awareness surrounding gender equality with the potential for long-term 
behavioral change.  
4.4.2. Tackling Corruption 
Corruption in Uganda is rampant. As one local Ugandan friend liked to joke, “If someone 
is stealing money or there is corruption to be seen, you know a Ugandan is present!” An 
October 2013 Human Rights Watch report titled, “Letting the Big Fish Swim,” highlights 
corruption throughout Uganda. One quote from Uganda’s Auditor General John Muwanga 
read, “Someone will ask, ‘Will it pay?’ If it will, one will steal. If it won’t pay, one won’t 
steal. It should be too expensive to steal. This is why corruption is happening on a grand scale. 
They must steal enough to stay out of jail.”50 Shortcomings in anti-corruption processes makes 
it more difficult to combat SGBV and corruption must be tackled more seriously. 
In addition to the information previously mentioned, the SGBV needs assessment survey 
also highlighted the failed access to justice that many individuals experience in relation to 
SGBV. In response to what challenges have you faced in accessing justice, 61% of women 
and 83% of men respondents said they did not have the money to pay bribes to the 
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court/police. When asked about Police Form 3, the required form that must be submitted to 
the police when reporting a SGBV case, 59% of women said they were not aware of it and 
what it was for while 22% of men said they were not aware of it and what it was for. Of those 
who were aware of it, 57% of women and 86% of men said they could not access it because 
they had trouble coming up with the money necessary to get the form. Although Police Form 
3 is required by law to be free of charge, often local authorities charge a UGX 5,000 ($2.00) 
bribe for each form requested. Keeping in mind that the average income of those interviewed 
was equivalent to $0.64 per day, this bribe clearly keeps justice out of reach from most.  
Tackling corruption on a larger country wide scale is necessary in Uganda. However, 
addressing nationwide corruption is also out of this paper’s scope. Keeping this in mind, there 
are clear small scale steps that the Ugandan government and NGOs/CBOs could take to 
combat corruption disrupting SGBV legal actions. First, local Ugandan MPs should demand 
independent audits of all police activity within their constituencies. This would make the 
likelihood of free and fair assessment more probable. Second, local NGO and CBO workers 
should provide services to accompany individuals seeking legal action to the police station. 
Many interviewees explained that police officers often take advantage of the fact that some 
requesting Police Form 3 are illiterate and are not familiar with basic laws. Therefore, if an 
NGO or CBO worker familiar with the process and procedures accompanied them, it would 
make the probability of the police officer requesting a bribe significantly less likely. In 
essence, stronger oversight is required to combat corruption and ensure access to justice for 
SGBV survivors. 
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4.4.3. Gender Mainstreaming 
Gender Mainstreaming is a critical UN endorsed and globally accepted approach and 
strategy that promotes gender equality in all aspects of life.51 According to the UN, 
mainstreaming “involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of 
gender equality are central to all activities—policy development, research, 
advocacy/dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and 
monitoring of programmes and projects.”52 One of the most effective ways to work towards 
gender equality and towards female empowerment is to ensure that all activities and 
programs within government and organizations take gender factors into consideration.53 
Because gender inequality is institutionalized, a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
gender which includes both males and females coordinating their ideas is needed to ensure 
long-term sustainable change.54 
Additionally, gender mainstreaming moves away from the notion that gender issues are 
women’s issues. Because of the structural inequality that exists and because of dominant 
power dynamics maintaining control, many often assume that gender is synonymous with 
women. However, this is a common misconception and men must be included within gender 
mainstreaming just as much as women are or gender inequality and SGBV will persist. For 
example, during northern Uganda’s IDP camp era in the war between the LRA and the UPDF, 
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some male IDPs noted they felt emasculated because they could no longer adequately provide 
for their families and could not prevent UPDF soldiers from raping their women. When the 
IDP camps were dismantled and NGOs began providing programs such as VSLA, they 
targeted women rather than men. While this did provide a sense of empowerment for women 
and provided many positive outcomes, male interviewees explained that they wanted to feel 
more included in VSLA and that they believed men should be targeted as well. When men are 
not included, gender inequality persists and the cycle of SGBV continues. As Rebecca Tinsley 
puts it, “There are clear links between sexual violence and women’s status in society, but the 
other side of this coin—the definition of masculinity—is just as important to the 
transformation of gender roles that underpins safety, security and equality.”55 
Every time the Ugandan government is looking at potential legislation to pass or reforming 
laws and every time NGOs/CBOs are designing new programs and activities, how everything 
will affect both men and women must be taken into serious consideration. If a program may 
have potential negative consequences for women as compared to men, this must be 
highlighted and debated to brainstorm how to mitigate those negative consequences. When 
governments and organizations do not engage in gender mainstreaming, gender inequalities 
continue as inequity is built further into law and programs. For example, if a government 
decides to conduct Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in the wake of conflict, it may be 
necessary to hold special women-only hearings to ensure safe spaces for women to feel 
comfortable sharing their testimonies.56 Therefore, all conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
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processes must include gender mainstreaming to consider how the conflict resolution process 
and peacebuilding activities will weigh differently on women and men. By ensuring gender is 
taken into consideration, both males and females will be better able to move past conflict. 
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V.   Chapter Five: Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 
“The prevention of war is too important to be left to the politicians.”  
                                                                                  –David P. Barash 
 
5.1. An Introduction to the Issue 
Peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of meanings, practices, and actions and can 
include everything from governmental development strategies, NGO humanitarian assistance, 
transitional justice, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) schemes. All 
of these examples, plus more, arguably contribute to a community, and more generally a 
nation’s, long-term peace. However, how a nation or a community embarks on this 
peacebuilding process and who is and is not included in it can seriously affect its outcomes 
and determine whether sustainable peace can be achieved. This chapter will focus specifically 
on the Ugandan government and the international community’s focus on DDR and 
International Criminal Court (ICC) legal prosecution in Uganda’s peacebuilding as compared 
with the local Acholi community’s and some NGO’s push for traditional justice mechanisms 
for inclusive peace. A look at this dual narrative’s real consequences relating to the attainment 
of both peace and justice in Uganda will be analyzed in hopes of understanding the normative 
arguments surrounding them and of understanding their pragmatic effects.  
5.1.1. Setting the Stage 
The question of peacebuilding in Uganda started long before the actual cessation of violent 
conflict. Early on during the war between the LRA and the UPDF a discussion of returned 
and captured militia abductees was necessary. Would all returned and captured non-UPDF 
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soldiers be officially arrested, jailed, and formally tried in national courts? Remembering that 
throughout the twenty year war an estimated 60,000 individuals were abducted, half being 
children, the reality of formal trails for all was unrealistic.1 Additionally, would individuals, 
many of whom were under 18 at the time of abduction, who were forcibly taken against their 
will be tried? What of those individuals made to engage in activities they themselves deemed 
immoral? Who bears responsibility when abducted soldiers are simply fulfilling orders to save 
their own lives? Since the Nuremburg Trials similar questions have filled the transitional 
justice and peacebuilding space. In Uganda, these questions ultimately resulted in the 
Amnesty Act of 2000. While the Amnesty Act is highly supported by most Ugandans and by 
the international community as a step in the right direction, it has failed to fully address justice.  
In light of the Amnesty Act’s lack of justice, in 2002 President Museveni invited the ICC 
to begin investigating crimes committed by the LRA in Uganda. The ICC is generally 
supported by the international community, in particular by the United Nations, as an answer 
to ending impunity for war criminals. In 2005 after three years of investigation the ICC 
indicted the top five leaders of the LRA on multiple crimes against humanity with counts 
including sexual enslavement, rape, the forced enlisting of child soldiers, cruel treatment, and 
attacks against civilian populations, to name some. 2  The combination of both the ICC’s 
indictment of the five main LRA leaders and the national Ugandan DDR process termed 
through the Amnesty Act seemed sufficient for the Ugandan government and for Western 
governments involved in supporting the nation’s domestic peace process. However, both the 
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ICC indictment and the national DDR process have failed to adequately incorporate traditional 
Acholi peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes as well which would make long-term 
peace more likely.  
Some NGOs operating in northern Uganda and certain local Acholis have both made 
arguments for the inclusion of traditional Acholi reconciliation, reintegration, and justice 
techniques and practices in the peace process. Arguments include that Western ideals of 
justice, law, and reintegration are not sufficient to truly address the issues of returning 
abductees and that until traditional techniques for mitigating conflict are integrated a lasting 
peace is not  achievable. Many Acholi feel that the Ugandan government’s reintegration 
packages offered to returned soldiers is not enough to address their reintegration into society. 
Additionally, for reasons which will be discussed later in this chapter, some Acholis do not 
want the top LRA leaders formally arrested and would rather continue to try and address the 
conflict through traditional conflict resolution techniques and community dialogues. 3 
However, significant critiques of these traditional practices themselves are also significant 
and must be looked at seriously. In Tim Allen’s words, “some of those spoken to were 
adamant that public rituals were useless, or could make things worse by concentrating 
polluting spirits” and that donors and local elites would use this “pseudo-traditional system” 
to gain influence.4 
 
                                                        
3 Confidential interview by author, Agago District, Uganda, September 2013.   
 
4 Tim Allen, “Bitter roots: the ‘invention’ of Acholi traditional justice,” in The Lord’s Resistance 
Army: Myth and Reality, ed. Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 249, 253.  
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5.2. Peacebuilding through DDR and ICC Indictments 
While it would be unfair and inaccurate to argue that the Ugandan government and 
Western governments focus all of their peacebuilding through DDR and support for the ICC 
indictments, these two actors predominantly use both DDR and the ICC indictments to push 
transitional justice in relation to peacebuilding. Therefore, a closer look at the reality of the 
two and the consequences experienced on the ground is a necessary starting point.  
5.2.1. DDR in Uganda: The Reality 
As noted by one Ugandan government official at the National DDR Stakeholders 
Conference hosted by the Amnesty Commission and held in Kampala, Uganda on November 
6th, 2013, “Uganda has been good at D and D, but R is much more difficult.” Since 2005 the 
Ugandan military, with the help of the African Union, regional partners, and international 
assistance, has effectively kept the LRA out of northern Uganda. Additionally, the LRA has 
been demobilized to now consist of an estimated 200 individuals. 5  Most returned LRA 
combatants have been successfully disarmed, weapons are reported to be surrendered from 
the now civilians, and no large number of weapons are missing or unaccounted for.6 This 
leaves only the “R,” the most difficult process in DDR that is crucially necessary to ensure 
long-term sustainable peace.  
Formal reintegration of returning LRA combatants was addressed in Uganda’s 2000 
Amnesty Act. Under the Amnesty Act any Ugandan individual who previously engaged in 
war against Uganda since January 26, 1986, “shall not be prosecuted or subject to any form 
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of punishment.”7 [Note: the only exception are the five ICC indicted LRA leaders which will 
be discussed further in the next section.] Ugandans who fit this ex-combatant qualification 
must immediately present themselves to the nearest Army/Police Unit, local government 
authority, or community religious leader, renounce their involvement against the Ugandan 
State, turn over any weapons, and then receive an official Amnesty Certificate.8 This will then 
make them eligible for reinsertion support to complete their formal and State certified 
reintegration process. Reinsertion packages to returned combatants include: the equivalent of 
$122 USD, medical costs up to $10.50 USD, one mattress, one blanket, one jerry can, one 
plastic washbasin, two pots, two sets of clothing, two hoes, one machete, five kilos of bean 
seeds, and five kilos of maize seeds.9 In addition to the fact that problems exist within the 
contents of the reinsertion packages themselves, such as bad seeds that nobody else wanted, 
many issues related to reintegration remain. 
As far as government is concerned, once a returned LRA combatant receives their 
Amnesty Certificate and reinsertion package from the Ugandan government they are officially 
reintegrated into society. However, as of November 6th, 2013 less than 8,000 individuals out 
of almost 30,000 who have been granted amnesty had received their reinsertion packages due 
to lack of resources.10 Additionally, at the National DDR Stakeholders Conference local civil 
society present in the audience voiced their frustration. Many argued that the Ugandan 
government had failed to incorporate Acholi and female opinions regarding reintegration, and 
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that as they are the ones that have suffered most from this conflict their voices should be front 
and center. 11  Questions surrounding whether the reinsertion packages and an amnesty 
certificate were really enough to deem individuals “reintegrated” into society arose as well 
and some comments pointed to the lack of assistance provided to other war survivors who do 
not fit the ex-combatant profile.  
5.2.2. The ICC in Uganda: The Reality 
In addition to the formal national DDR process taking place, transitional justice,  
“the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different 
countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses”, in Uganda includes 
the ICC’s involvement.12 The Ugandan government referred the LRA to the ICC on December 
16, 2003 in an official submission stating, “Having exhausted every other means of bringing 
an end to this terrible suffering, the Republic of Uganda now turns to the newly established 
ICC and its promise of global justice.”13 Following the referral, lead prosecutor Luis Moreno 
Ocampo and his team at the ICC began investigating the situation in northern Uganda. On 
July 8, 2005 arrest warrants for the five main LRA leaders were issued on twenty-one counts 
of war crimes and twelve counts of crimes against humanity.14 LRA leader Joseph Kony, his 
deputy Vincent Otti, and commanders Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic 
Ongwen were the first individuals the ICC ever indicted. The expectation was that with such 
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clear violations of crimes against humanity committed, prosecutions and convictions would 
be straightforward.15 However, the northern Uganda case was clearly more complicated than 
initially perceived.  
Nine years after the initial ICC indictments, two have died and three are still at large. 
Lacking the means, the necessary legal framework, and sufficient enforcement mechanisms 
to enter into sovereign territory and formally arrest the three remaining fugitives, the ICC can 
do little but condemn the LRA and vocally support the military campaign against them. 
Although amnesty remains in place for all other LRA members, the Ugandan government 
feels strongly that the leaders must face arrest to reach justice. However, criticisms of the 
ICC’s involvement in Uganda are rampant. Many groups, including the Amnesty Commission 
of Uganda and various Ugandan religious groups have spoken out against the ICC’s 
involvement, noting that the threat of prosecution will worsen the situation.16 Other criticisms 
include that the ICC indictment only addresses one side of the war. The charges are only 
directed at the LRA and completely ignore all UPDF crimes. Additionally, the LRA has 
vocalized that they will not sign any peace agreement with the Ugandan government unless 
the ICC withdraws its indictments.17 
While not the focus of this paper, it is important to point out that many broader ICC 
criticisms also exist. For example, it lacks effective implementation in a world system 
consisting of nation-states and it needs a proper enforcement mechanism. Additionally, 
criticisms that it engages in selective prosecution and investigation resulting in 
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neoimperialism and racism exist, pointing to the fact that to date all thirty-two indictments 
have been for Africans. Some critics claim that the Court has insufficient rights of the accused, 
while others exclaim it unintentionally provides a safe haven for war criminals and doles out 
lenient sentences for grave crimes committed. For example, Congolese Thomas Lubanga, the 
first person the ICC arrested, was convicted in 2012 on charges of conscripting children under 
the age of fifteen and using them “to participate actively in hostilities,” he was only given a 
fourteen year sentence.18 
5.2.3. DDR and ICC Shortcomings and Opinions 
In most conversations and interviews with local Acholis, individuals were grateful for the 
amnesty law ensuring that returning militia soldiers would not be arrested and prosecuted. 
However, congruently most were unhappy with the government’s determination of what 
“reintegration” meant and felt that not enough was done to support them. For example, one 
individual explained, “Reintegration is not just a piece of paper and some material things, 
what does reintegration actually mean to the community and how will that person live again 
amongst his people?”19 Another highlighted that further investment in the region as a whole 
would be most helpful and that government sponsored vocational schools with job 
opportunities are what proper reintegration would look like. 20  Additionally, some 
interviewees disagreed that the top LRA leaders should be arrested at all.  
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Interview after interview with local Acholi villagers, most of whom were not ex-
combatants themselves but knew individuals who were or had family members who had never 
returned after abduction, revealed that some did not want to see any LRA militia members 
arrested. One older woman explained, “They are our children out there. If Kony is arrested, 
maybe the others will never come back.”21 It was made clear that many did not feel it was 
necessary to formally prosecute Joseph Kony and the other leaders to experience justice and 
live in peace. Rather, time and again interviewees expressed a simple desire to have an 
explanation for why such severe violence continued for so long. These observations are 
reinforced in a 2010 UC Berkeley Human Rights Center survey conducted in northern Uganda 
where they found that 45% of those interviewed desired peace through amnesty alone while 
15% desired peace through trials.22 However, while 45% believed in peace through amnesty 
alone, only 6% believed that the ICC had actually hindered the peace process.23 Additionally, 
some referenced their belief in Kony’s spirit possession for reasons why they do not want to 
see him arrested explaining that if he is prosecuted the spirit within him will further punish 
them and make the Acholi population suffer more.24 
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As Kony and the rest of the LRA leaders remain at large, it is unclear what would exactly 
happen were he caught tomorrow. The United States has invested significant help to find 
Joseph Kony and the two other living LRA leaders by providing 100 military advisors as well 
as some civil servants focused specifically on finding them. Additionally, they have 
announced a $5 million reward for information relating 
to their whereabouts. It is generally assumed if any are 
caught alive they would be transferred to the Hague for 
their subsequent ICC trial. However, the United States 
is not party to the ICC and the African Union and the 
Ugandan government have been vocally dismissive of 
the Court in recent years. Additionally, in an interview 
with a U.S. Embassy official in Kampala, it was noted 
that while he was personally supportive of the ICC 
indictment of the three remaining LRA leaders, he 
believed the Ugandan legal system would be able to handle the trial themselves. 25  The 
Ugandan government’s and the ICC’s push, backed by the U.S., for the arrest of the remaining 
LRA leaders in order to promote justice seems misfit when many of those most directly 
affected by the war disagree with formal prosecution. As an alternative to transitional justice 
in the form of DDR and ICC indictments, some promote traditional practices that would focus 
on conflict resolution and reconciliation for a lasting peace. 
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5.3. Peacebuilding through Traditional Acholi Justice 
Some in the Acholi population and some NGOs argue that traditional Acholi justice must 
be further incorporated into Uganda’s national peacebuilding process for sustained long-term 
peace to be realized. However, what this would look like, who would be included and 
excluded, and whether it would accurately represent Acholi tradition are all important 
questions that are not easily answered. A further look into what traditional Acholi justice 
actually is and what its critiques are remain important to move closer towards a comprehensive 
peacebuilding process.  
5.3.1. What is Traditional Acholi Justice? 
Traditional Acholi justice promoters argue that this form of transitional justice represents 
a consensus amongst the entire Acholi population of what “a local articulation of universal 
standards of justice and human rights” looks like.26 One of the most espoused reports backing 
Acholi traditional justice is anthropologist and former Oxfam Uganda head Dennis Pain’s 
1997 The Bending of Spears: Producing Consensus for Peace and Development in Northern 
Uganda. In this report Pain argues that traditionally conflict in Acholiland was addressed by 
local elders who guided the resolution process by engaging in ceremonial practices bringing 
both parties together. He writes, “The practice of reconciliation lies at the heart of a traditional 
approach to the situation…far beyond the limited approaches of conservative western legal 
systems and a formal amnesty for offenses against the state.”27 Pain asserts that due to the 
northern conflict and subsequent displacement, these traditional networks and values have 
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broken down and been replaced with Western ideas of justice and conflict resolution. 28 
Therefore, he and others promoting these ideas believe conflict resolution is not working 
effectively and international donors, foreign governments, and the Ugandan government 
should work to support traditional Acholi justice.  
Most of the focus on traditional Acholi justice surrounds one main local ritual known as 
mato oput (drinking the bitter root). In an interview with local Acholis regarding this practice, 
it was explained as a ritual that takes place between two parties when someone has been killed 
at another’s hand, whether intentional or not. Elders from the perpetrator’s community go and 
visit the elders of the victim’s community and try to persuade them to accept peace and 
compensation, this may be a back and forth exchange until the affected community agrees to 
make peace.29 Once all elders accept peace, both parties sit down together and drink from one 
communal pot that contains part of a bitter tree representing the pain the community has 
suffered. While drinking together they talk and confess about what suffering occurred in the 
past, in a sense the relationship between the two communities start over and peace is reached.30 
The two parties then sit and agree together what compensation will be paid by the one 
community to the other. Traditionally, this compensation will take the form of a young girl 
from the perpetrator’s community given to the affected clan with the idea that a relative of the 
deceased will marry her and produce a child to replace the killed individual. 31  This 
explanation of mato oput runs synonymous with Adam Branch’s and Tim Allen’s description 
of the practice as well, except that Tim Allen clarifies that the communal drink is “a 
                                                        
28 Ibid, 54.   
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30 Ibid.   
 
31 Ibid.   
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concoction made from the blood of sacrificed sheep and a bitter root.”32 Only after this ritual 
takes place can both communities truly experience both peace and justice in their entirety.33  
While not as referenced as mato oput, other traditional Acholi justice techniques exist as 
well including gomo tong (bending the spears), lwako pik wang (washing away the tears), 
mayo tipu (cleansing the spirit), tamu kir (cleaning for an abominable act), and mayo piny 
(cleaning a specific area).34 One particular practice described in an interview that relates 
directly to conflict resolution and the returning of former abductees is nyono tong gweno 
(stepping on eggs). As explained, this practice occurs when an individual returns to a 
community when he or she has been gone a long time, usually when off fighting in the bush. 
The returning individual may have brought back bad spirits with them, therefore when he or 
she begins coming into contact with others from the community harm may come.35 To be 
cleansed and welcomed back to the community the returning individual must step on branches 
laid over eggs, breaking them. Only then will they be free from bad spirits and be able to fully 
reintegrate into society.36 
5.3.2. Traditional Acholi Justice and its Critiques 
Traditional Acholi justice promoters argue that a return to local conflict resolution 
mechanisms must take place to realize peace and justice in its entirety. Pain’s report in 1997 
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was highly read and caught the attention of others espousing the same ideas. For example, in 
2005 an influential report came out by the Liu Institute for Global Issues and circulated at the 
Gulu District NGO Forum called Roco Wat I Acholi: Restoring Relationships in Acholi-land: 
Traditional Approaches to Justice and Reintegration. 37  Additionally, the World Bank 
references the importance of traditional approaches to justice in their Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund Project (NUSAF). 38  Others, including Caritas (a Catholic aid agency) and 
USAID’s Northern Ugandan Peace Initiative (NUPI), also were among those who emphasized 
the importance of local traditional approaches to conflict resolution and “by mid-2005, dozens 
of mato oput ceremonies were being performed, occasionally attended by a host of aid workers 
and journalists.”39 
Promoting culturally held traditional practices over Western imposed notions of peace and 
justice sounds ideal on the surface. However, when uncovered deeper a less rosy picture 
emerges. Tim Allen points out that the only reason mato oput is particularly singled out 
compared to the dozen or so other traditional practices associated with conflict resolution is 
because it was the focus of Dennis Pain’s influential 1997 report that sparked the entire 
international donor promotion of traditional Acholi justice.40 Additionally, when independent 
researchers and other NGOs went to investigate Pain’s findings, most concluded differing 
results noting that many disagreed over who the true traditional leaders were, whether or not 
the traditional structures were such a key priority, and whether elders themselves knew how 
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40 Ibid, 245.   
 103 
to carry out these old practices.41 Non-Acholis who suffered from the northern war, mostly 
those of Langi and Madi descent, feel no connection at all to Acholi practices of conflict 
resolution and a consensus across the entire Acholi population for what these practices look 
like, who should perform them, and whether they help is not found.42 In the 2010 UC Berkeley 
Human Rights Center survey conducted in northern Uganda, only 8% of those interviewed 
believed peace should be reached through traditional ceremonies.43 
Branch also notes that Pain’s 1997 report dehistoricizes the conflict by making the conflict 
resolution process a completely internal reconciliation practice.44 However, as noted earlier 
the conflict in northern Uganda is not only an internal conflict and many external actors 
including the Ugandan government, foreign governments, and NGOs are all involved. 
Another strong critique of the traditional Acholi justice paradigm is Adam Branch’s point that 
“male elders are presented as the privileged repositories and guardians of tradition and the 
exclusive mediators with the spiritual world.”45 Not only does this demonize Acholi youth as 
“deviant rebels with the singular Acholi culture” but also adds a gender dimension that has 
the potential to justify sexual and gender based violence. 46  For example, the traditional 
practice of giving a young girl from the perpetrator’s clan to the victim’s clan is a form of 
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forced marriage and a serious human rights violation. Returning to certain aspects in 
traditional Acholi justice would in effect reinstitutionalize these harmful practices under this 
peace regime. Many traditional gender roles were challenged throughout the twenty year war 
as families and clans were displaced and lives were turned upside down. To argue that 
traditional practices and roles should return to exactly as they were before the war would be 
to assume nothing in Acholiland has changed. In this sense, Branch notes that this kind of 
transitional justice is in fact a “private project carried out by men to redeem what they see as 
a deeply corrupted Acholi society” and that “community-based justice cannot be reduced to a 
male-dominated version of traditional justice because the community itself, especially now 
after two decades of war, is in no way reducible to those who would claim traditional 
authority.”47 
 
5.4. Peace vs. Justice: Moving towards Inclusive Peace 
Where does this leave peacebuilding and transitional justice now? Despite the critiques—
is there any place for DDR processes, the ICC, and traditional Acholi justice to help ensure 
lasting peace and successful conflict resolution in Uganda? Ideally, the peacebuilding process 
achieves both peace and justice. However, in practice this may not always be realistic. Some 
argue that for a nation or a community to realize peace, justice must be served. In turn, others 
argue that for a nation or a community to successfully achieve justice, peace must first be 
present. But, if peace and justice are needed to successfully realize long-term sustainable 
peace through a productive peacebuilding process, how does one go about achieving both?  
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5.4.1. Peace vs. Justice and the False Dichotomy 
Western contemporary analysts often try to boil realities down to simple good or bad 
situations, diminishing complexities and reducing scenarios to an either/or basis. To make 
information digestible to consumers all nuances are erased and simple explanations take their 
place. In the peace versus justice debate, it is argued that pursuing justice risks a destabilizing 
hazard by those threatened with punishment. Thus, arguing that justice must be foregone in 
the interest of peace. This is often recited in the case with the LRA because Joseph Kony has 
made public that he will not surrender until the ICC indictment is removed and he is granted 
amnesty.48 Continuing with this argument, if justice is not foregone then it assumes there will 
never be true peace because Joseph Kony will never surrender. The other argument is that 
without proper justice, the affected communities will never experience true peace and they 
will not be able to move on with their lives after the atrocities that occurred. Therefore, justice 
must come first and then peace will follow. 
However, must one make such a stark choice between pursuing justice or reaching peace? 
As Chandra Lekha Sriram points out in her introduction to Confronting Past Human Rights 
Violations: Justice vs Peace in Times of Transition, “while there are trade-offs, the choice is 
not simply either peace or justice.”49 The reasoning that peace and justice cannot be realized 
together simultaneously and that to achieve one the other must be forgone is a convenient 
argument whose black and white false dichotomy has no justification in most real world 
situations. Simplifying complex scenarios and forcing an either/or option fails to seriously 
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address the entire dilemma. When asking interviewees their opinions regarding peace versus 
justice in relation to the conflict in northern Uganda, many registered their confusion of why 
one had to be chosen over the other. One individual commented, “Peace or justice? Why must 
we pick one? Why can we not have both?”50  
5.4.2. What Might the Future Look Like? 
To pursue both peace and justice in relation to the situation in northern Uganda, a 
comprehensive transitional justice approach incorporating aspects from the national DDR 
process, the ICC indictments, and traditional Acholi justice is necessary.  No panacea in 
relation to peacebuilding or transitional justice, where certain direct actions will always 
definitively lead to long-term sustainable peace, exists. However, a mixture of local, national, 
and international level responses to transitional justice and peacebuilding is more likely to 
create a holistic approach creating long-term peace.  
The Ugandan government’s national approach to DDR, which encompasses the Amnesty 
Act, is crucial to maintain as abductees continue to return from the bush. However, the 
government and DDR supporters should reevaluate their reintegration process to determine 
how they could more effectively support individuals meld back into society. Additionally, 
reintegration should not stop at material products given to returned soldiers, reintegration is 
much more. Reintegration is arguably the most important and most difficult part in the DDR 
process because if it is not carefully addressed individuals can easily leave again to join a 
militia faction or create their own. This was seen in the DRC with the M23 rebel group who 
was unsuccessfully reintegrated into the Congolese army and broke off to start their own 
formal rebellion when they failed to receive promised compensation. Also, reintegration 
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should not be narrowly viewed as only attributable to former abductees. In reality, other war 
survivors, including those living in IDP camps for up to a decade, also greatly suffered and 
need government assistance reintegrating into society. Therefore, reintegration should be 
looked at in a more holistic manner and encompass greater populations on a wider scale in the 
form of regional investment and development in social services like education and vocational 
training.  
In relation to the ICC indictments, while much criticism regarding the Court has been 
highlighted and much has been said about how the ICC indictments in 2005 disrupted the 
peace process, the reality is that if the ICC indictments were removed at this point in time it 
would do more harm than good. In the 2010 UC Berkeley Human Rights Center survey 
previously mentioned only 6% believed the ICC indictments had hindered the peace process 
while 38% believed the ICC indictments had helped the LRA to leave Uganda and 43% 
believed the ICC indictments had generally helped the situation in northern Uganda.51 Despite 
deep rooted ICC criticisms, the new international organization represents a positive step in the 
right direction of eradicating global impunity and may signify a necessary launch pad for 
future global legal visions. While the Ugandan case shows that the Court’s lack of 
enforcement mechanisms hinder it from bringing indicted criminals to justice, it is important 
to remember that this is a nascent organization and the potential for proper enforcement may 
be a future possibility. Although criticisms that it is a form of Western imperialism and targets 
Africans are serious, it is important to note that one of the largest and powerful Western 
powers, the United States, is not a part of it. Additionally, while it is wrong to solely 
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investigate Africans, few could argue that all individuals currently indicted by the ICC does 
not have significant evidence of egregious crimes against them. However, to make the 
situation more equitable and fair in the eyes of Acholi people in northern Uganda, UPDF 
crimes should be investigated as well. While the ICC is nowhere near perfect, it represents a 
work in progress toward a global justice system where individuals acting on the world stage 
cannot operate with impunity. Just as the League of Nations was reworked to create the United 
Nations, so too may the ICC one day be reworked to create a more comprehensive legal 
international institution. 
Traditional Acholi justice also has a necessary place in transitional justice and 
peacebuilding in northern Uganda. While criticisms regarding traditional Acholi justice were 
highlighted above, it is important to note that no generalized consensus on its use for conflict 
resolution and reconciliation exists. Therefore, each village and community must determine 
for themselves what the necessary and ideal local practices are that will lead to peace while 
simultaneously being careful not to reinstitutionalize harmful practices such as forced 
marriage. As explained, mato oput is simply one traditional practice that was highlighted due 
to its notable reference in Dennis Pain’s work on Acholi traditional justice. However, many 
other traditional techniques exist that an Acholi community may find more appealing and 
relatable. Although, this must be determined by the community together rather than pushed 
for by foreign donors and NGO workers. With this reformed and rethought national DDR 
process, ICC indictments, and community based and mutually decided upon forms of 
traditional Acholi justice, both peace and justice can be accomplished concurrently.  
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VI.   Chapter Six: Destructive Displacement  
“We didn’t need food, we needed protection. We knew how to farm and feed ourselves, 
what we needed was not to be slaughtered in our fields.”                      –Former Acholi IDP 
 
6.1. What is the Problem? 
At the end of northern Uganda’s twenty year war roughly 1.8 million northerners, mostly 
Acholis, had been displaced from their ancestral homes.1 Some were abductees, many fled to 
urban centers in other parts of the country, a few escaped Uganda all together, and most, 
almost one million of them, spent years living in “protected villages,” the Ugandan 
government’s euphemism for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. 2  This forced 
displacement and organization of almost the entire Acholi region into IDP camps by the 
Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) not only contributed to the dire humanitarian 
situation in northern Uganda, but also ensured lasting hardship for a whole population, thus 
preventing successful conflict resolution. 
6.1.1. Setting the Stage 
In 1996 the Ugandan government began their new forced displacement policy of the 
Acholi people.3 UPDF soldiers began coercing rural Acholi villagers to leave their historic 
familial homes and move to “protected villages.” After arriving to the IDP camp location, 
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civilians were told to build their own thatched roof hut shelter and they were told that if found 
outside the camp they would be considered rebels and treated accordingly. The conditions in 
the IDP camps were monstrous: overcrowding, poor infrastructure, and sparse resources led 
to horrific sanitation conditions and increased mortality. A 2005 United Nations article 
confirmed that “A total excess mortality of 28,283, of which 11,068 [are] children under five, 
can be projected for the entire Acholi region between January and July 2005, namely about 
1,000 excess deaths per week.”4 Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot refer to the IDP camps as 
“rural prisons” and Adam Branch categorizes them as “internment camps” that were the 
greatest cause of suffering in northern Uganda.5 
At the start of the forced removals and relocation to IDP camps, the Ugandan government 
was unable to provide survival level food and living conditions. The situation in IDP camps 
was so dire that Acholi civilians were risking the dangers of leaving to return to their villages. 
A United Nations Humanitarian Situation Report notes, “[civilians] expressed a reluctance to 
stay where they were; having found no food, water or sanitation facilities at the site they were 
talking about returning home.”6 However, humanitarian aid agencies responded exactly as the 
Ugandan government desired when the government realized their new forced displacement 
policy would only be successful when coupled with humanitarian aid organizations footing 
the bill for food, sanitation, water, and general camp management. In 1996 when the Ugandan 
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government asked the United Nations World Food Program for aid and they quickly answered 
the call, many other humanitarian organizations rushed in to assist as well.7 The northern 
Ugandan case was humanitarianism made easy in the sense that the UPDF was successfully 
providing aid agencies hundreds of thousands of concentrated civilians in dire need of food 
and services. Rather than seriously question the Ugandan military’s destructive displacement 
campaign, humanitarian groups rushed in to help the Ugandan government in any way they 
could in its fight against the LRA. In effect, the region was “‘losing more lives through 
secondary effects of the war than the war itself,’ most of those effects proceeding directly 
from displacement.”8 
With the influx of humanitarian aid agencies sustaining the IDP camps all parties seemed 
better off, except one. The Ugandan government had foreign organizations paying for one of 
their campaigns, the UPDF had humanitarian groups implementing their policy including 
camp management and food distribution, humanitarian aid agencies had an easily accessible 
population in clear need of their services, and foreign governments kept their East African 
idealized partner, pointing to their “protected villages” as an appropriate response to the war. 
However, for the intended Acholi civilian beneficiaries, the displacement and IDP camp 
situation exacerbated the humanitarian crisis already taking place. 
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6.2. Response to the Problem 
Local Acholi civilians, humanitarian aid groups, and international governments responded 
differently to the displacement and IDP camp reality. The effects of forced displacement did 
not only have consequences during the actual time of the campaign, but also in the conflict’s 
aftermath as it continues to affect post-conflict reconstruction and conflict resolution.  
6.2.1. Local and Traditional Response during Conflict 
As explained earlier, at the beginning of the UPDF’s forced displacement campaign 
starting in 1996, many Acholis were resisting and returning to their homes after arriving at the 
IDP camp and finding nothing. However, as the humanitarian aid agencies flooded in to 
provide food and services the number of civilians leaving the camps reduced. While the 
agencies were successful by “providing enough food and supplies to keep people in the camps 
by making life in the camps possible for most people, they did not provide enough to prevent 
what became a massive humanitarian crisis.” 9  A delicate balance had been reached by 
humanitarian groups, which offered civilians just enough services to not leave. Additionally, 
the Ugandan government was careful to suppress any local opposition that would seriously 
question their displacement policy.  
Most civilians living in IDP camps were simply trying to live while combatting survival 
level conditions. Therefore, few had the energy to think about rebelling against the forced 
displacement policy. However, not all were accepting of their situation. To prevent and 
contain local opposition from forming amongst the Acholi population within the IDP camps, 
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the Ugandan government worked carefully to depoliticize them.10 For example, activists and 
organizers operating in the IDP camps were targeted by the UPDF and told that if they spoke 
freely about the situation in the camps they would be accused as rebels. 11  Additionally, 
Ugandan security forces operating in and around the camps were more concerned with 
engaging in arbitrary arrests, torture, and death to suppress any vocal IDP discontent than 
actually protecting those residing there.12 In this sense, the Ugandan government successfully 
quelled any potentially affective local and traditional response to their campaign of forced 
displacement.  
6.2.2. Local and Traditional Response after Conflict 
In discussions and interviews about the war in northern Uganda with local Acholis who 
spent years living in IDP camps, forced displacement continues to be one of the most 
reoccurring themes that surfaces. Many consequences of forced displacement still exist seven 
to eight years after the IDP camps disbanded and the Acholi population is still greatly affected. 
For example, throughout the duration of civilians’ stay in the IDP camps, people were not 
allowed to leave to tend to farms. Not only did this then underscore their reliance on food aid 
from foreign donors, but it produced a generation of youth growing up in the camps who lack 
agricultural knowledge. In a region where traditionally over 90% of the population are 
subsistence farmers, this is devastating to people’s livelihoods. While this increases flight to 
urban centers for people in search of work, it simultaneously contributes to rural 
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unemployment. Additionally, during and after the IDP camps, alcoholism rates increased 
dramatically as many who were unable to farm, and later those who lacked the knowhow, 
turned to brewing cheap local liquor for income.13 In turn, this increased rate of alcohol 
consumption correlates with an increase in SGBV.14  
Besides losing farming skills, increased alcoholism, and increased SGBV, forced 
displacement resulted in land degradation. Some IDP camps allowed inhabitants to leave the 
premises during daylight hours to collect firewood if they kept within a seven kilometer radius 
of the camp. This resulted in the complete destruction of all potential firewood material 
surrounding the camp as IDPs were forced to take anything within the 7 kilometer radius that 
they could. Not only did this destroy the land surrounding the IDP camps, but locals whose 
villages happened to be within 7 kilometers of the camp returned to nothing. One such villager 
noted, “Before we were forced to move to the camp we were able to cook and had fruit trees, 
but when we returned in 2006 all the trees were completely gone.”15 Some local villages 
located near former IDP camps are now suffering from severe flooding due to land 
degradation. Prior to the IDP camp era, small forests located near villages acted to protect the 
land from flooding. However, without any of these trees left to help absorb land water, 
villagers are suffering.  
Additionally, many interviewed individuals voiced current psychosocial trauma due to 
their experience living in IDP camps. One person noted, “When we lived in the camp we had 
nothing, we had to leave our old hut, our goats, our chickens, everything. The conditions were 
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so bad, everyone was living together so close and alcoholism and violence increased. No one 
acknowledges this now, no one compensates us.”16 In Ugandan post-war conflict resolution, 
IDP compensation is absent. Let alone compensation, the Ugandan government has never 
apologized to the Acholi population for their forced displacement policy and they certainly 
have not acknowledged the fact that they might have made the situation worse. All 
compensation and recognition in the conflict resolution and DDR process, and more 
specifically in the reintegration process, has been directed at formerly abducted soldiers. This 
failure to explicitly include forced displacement and its consequences in the conflict resolution 
process not only angers the affected population, but may result in sustainable peace being 
unsuccessful in the long-run.  
6.2.3. International Response during Conflict 
As described previously, international humanitarian agencies responded quickly to the 
Ugandan government’s call for aid to maintain the IDP camps as part of their forced 
displacement military campaign. However, to say there was no recognition or conversation at 
all by international humanitarian agencies about whether they should intervene and provide 
support to the IDP camps is unfair and not true. In reality, there is evidence that there was at 
least some discussion between organizations about whether their humanitarian intervention 
might put them in a position complicit with Uganda’s military campaign. A 1997 United 
Nations Humanitarian Situation Report reads, 
Humanitarian agencies and NGOs are divided as to whether to assist in the `protected 
villages'. It appears that basic services in the villages are inadequate and that public 
health will be threatened unless international agencies intervene. Humanitarian 
agencies are, however, reluctant to be seen to be helping implement what they regard 
as a military strategy, while also questioning whether the villages will protect people 
or actually make them more vulnerable to attack. The LRA has already stated its 
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opposition to the villages and attacks have taken place despite the presence of UPDF 
troops.17  
Nevertheless, after a few of the largest organizations decided to go forward and intervene, 
others followed suit and the questioning of the IDP camps themselves and forced displacement 
ended.18  
Not only were international humanitarian aid organizations complicit during the era of 
forced displacement in northern Uganda, but certain international governments, specifically 
the United States, was complicit as well. With Ugandan President Museveni’s vocal 
promotion of democracy and willingness to work closely with Western governments, the 
United States views Uganda as a close ally in east Africa and never questioned their military 
policy of forced displacement as a humanitarian crisis creator. Although President George W. 
Bush’s militaristic United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) did not become operational 
until 2008, the United States military has been involved in providing humanitarian and 
development aid to Uganda since 2003.19 Additionally, other foreign governments, such as 
Britain through their Department for International Development (DFID), were providing mass 
amounts of aid to the Ugandan government to help them maintain IDP camps. In 2007 the 
International Development Committee of the British Parliament revealed that foreign donors 
were spending $200 million per year to maintain IDP camps throughout northern Uganda.20 
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Rather than critically analyzing the specific military policy driving the need for IDP camps, 
foreign donors assisted in any way that they could.  
Shortly after the Ugandan government’s initial call for aid in 1996 and foreign donors 
quick response, “the [Ugandan] government came to expect aid agencies to intervene to 
support those whom it displaced and was therefore more willing to use mass displacement as 
a strategy than it would have been without humanitarian aid.”21 In 1996 the UPDF had forcibly 
relocated a few hundred thousand civilians into IDP camps; however, by 2005 they were able 
to successfully force one million Acholis into their “protected villages.”22 Time and again 
foreign humanitarian aid agencies and foreign governments heeded the Ugandan 
government’s call for aid while simultaneously castigating the LRA. This is not to suggest in 
any way that the LRA was less horrific than they were, it is simply meant to direct attention 
to the fact that the LRA was not alone in committing atrocities during the war in northern 
Uganda and that foreign donors may have been indirectly complicit in supporting these acts. 
One NGO worker argued that it was the silent United Nations who should be pushing the 
Ugandan government on their policies as they put it, “Where is the UN’s leadership around 
the IDP Policy? Where’s the denunciation?”23 
6.2.4. International Response after Conflict 
After the conflict in northern Uganda ended in 2005, the IDP camps were disbanded 
throughout 2006 and 2007. However, while the camps formally closed, food aid was 
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terminated, and individuals were encouraged to return to their ancestral homesteads, many 
civilians did not return home. Some villages were so destroyed that returning did not seem 
practical, some civilians wanted to remain closer to commercial centers, and some simply 
lacked the resources to make the transition on their own.24 In a conversation while walking 
through a former IDP camp, where many huts from the camp era still stand and continue to 
be inhabited, an individual remarked, “These old beaten down huts are town eyesores, these 
people need to go home to their villages where they are from. Someone must help them move 
back, because they can’t on their own.”25 While many humanitarian organizations stayed in 
northern Uganda after 2005 and continued to provide certain services such as psychosocial 
support and vocational training, most of these services were directed specifically at returned 
child soldiers. This left individuals returning from IDP camps to fend for themselves without 
any external support even though many suffered just as much, albeit in different ways, than 
those returning from the bush.  
Additionally, as alluded to earlier, when the conflict ended and the LRA was effectively 
pushed out of northern Uganda, international organizations’ and governments’ desire to bring 
justice to the situation was focused on the LRA’s atrocities. Again, while not in any way 
validating the LRA’s heinous crimes, it is the simple goal to show other wrongdoings as well. 
Rather than equally call attention to and investigate both LRA and UPDF atrocities committed 
during the northern war, including the forced displacement of 1.8 million Acholis and the 
internment of one million, many international governments and humanitarian organizations 
have focused solely on the LRA, remaining silent towards the UPDF. During private 
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interviews in Kampala with individuals from Resolve Uganda, Invisible Children, and the 
ENOUGH Project, all representatives acknowledged their silence towards UPDF atrocities 
and sole focus on LRA crimes. One of the organization’s representatives explained that it was 
easier to focus on the LRA because they are not controversial; no one, except maybe those 
heavily entrenched within the militia itself, agrees with their tactics.26 This suggests that on 
the other hand the UPDF’s forced displacement policy resulting in further deaths continues to 
be perceived as a potentially justifiable tactic. Another organizational representative clearly 
admitted that forcing people into IDP camps was one of the single greatest mistakes that 
caused the humanitarian crisis to continue. He also frustratingly expressed that he believed 
there would never be any sincere justice when it came to UPDF crimes, especially while 
President Museveni’s current NRM party is in power.27 The interviewee continued on to call 
for humanitarian organizations and foreign governments, with the United States leading the 
way, to look more critically at crimes from all sides and to be more vocal in criticizing the 
Ugandan government. However, his pessimism for this reality betrayed his words.28 Finally, 
one representative noted that they have not called attention to the UPDF atrocities and focus 
instead just on the LRA crimes because they must simply “pick their battles.”29 While the 
threat of being expelled from Uganda for simply publically questioning their military policy 
and the atrocities the UPDF engaged in during the war may be real or imagined, can a situation 
where only one side is thoroughly investigated and exposed be considered morally just?  
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6.3. Outcomes 
What does all this actually mean? The last section of this chapter works to briefly and 
clearly highlight the current reality facing northern Uganda in the aftermath of the Ugandan 
government’s forced displacement military policy. Additionally, it attempts to ask the difficult 
questions of what could have been done differently to abate some of the terror that presented 
itself due to displacement and of what could be done now to move forward towards a more 
inclusive conflict resolution process that will ultimately result in lasting peace for the nation 
and the region more generally.  
6.3.1. The Current Reality 
As highlighted earlier, many consequences stemming from the Ugandan government’s 
forced displacement policy during the northern war continue to affect the Acholi population. 
Consequences discussed earlier include the generational loss of agricultural knowledge, anger 
and frustration over the lack of compensation for time spent in IDP camps, and the present 
land degradation many returned villagers are dealing with on their property. However, two 
other serious realities mentioned briefly before exist that are correlated to displacement and 
the IDP camp era including alcoholism and SGBV.  
During the time that Acholi civilians were living in IDP camps, one individual explained 
that “the days were long but the nights were short, with not much to do.”30 A returned abductee 
that lived in the IDP camp upon her return noted that when night fell, “my heart would beat 
so fast, like boom boom boom all night with barely any sleep until dawn came because I was 
so scared.”31 This, she explained, was because nights were filled with fear and thoughts of 
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attacks and abduction, as this continued to occur despite the fact that the UPDF was 
supposedly “protecting” the camps. While sleep was sparse at night, for most, days were filled 
with childcare, cleaning, and cooking of the scare food aid delivered to them. As most 
individuals living in the IDP camps were subsistence farmers and most were not able to farm 
during this time, many noted experiencing boredom saying that there was nothing to do. In 
response, many, particularly men, turned to alcohol. Some brewed alcohol for personal 
consumption while others brewed alcohol to try and gain any kind of livelihood that they 
could while living in the camp. Regardless, time and again interviewees noted a serious 
increase in alcohol consumption and alcoholism beginning from the time of the IDP camps, a 
legacy that continues today. According to a 2011 World Health Organization report, Uganda 
is ranked 28th in the world for most amount of alcohol consumed per capita and 2nd on the 
African continent after Nigeria.32 However, in 1996, prior to the official Ugandan forced 
displacement policy began, Uganda was ranked 134th in the world for most alcohol consumed 
per capita and 31st on the African continent.33 While a direct causation link cannot be drawn 
between Uganda’s aggregate alcohol consumption per capita increase and the UPDF’s forced 
displacement policy, a correlation does seem plausible. This alcoholism legacy from the IDP 
camps negatively affects the everyday life of many living in northern Uganda in terms of 
poverty, health, and specifically, increased SGBV levels.  
As carefully discussed and analyzed in chapter four, SGBV continues to be a serious 
problem facing northern Ugandan communities, and facing the country as a whole. In an effort 
not to repeat previously stated information, the connection between displacement and SGBV 
                                                        
32 “Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health,” World Health Organization, Geneva, 2011.  
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should simply be highlighted in this section. In particular, SGBV’s relation to the increased 
alcoholism rate from the time of the camp should be underscored. It should be noted that in 
independent SGBV research conducted in Agago District, 77% of female respondents and 
72% of male respondents noted alcoholism as the main cause of SGBV. Also, when asked 
“Do you think being in an IDP camp during the war has contributed to the high rates of 
domestic violence?” 84% of female respondents and 80% of male respondents replied yes.  
6.3.2. What Could have been Done Differently? 
Many argue that aid agencies had no choice but to go in and support those living in the 
IDP camps. They claim that “they were faced with two morally bad choices: one, to provide 
aid to the camps and save lives, but in doing so to support the government’s possibly illegal 
counterinsurgency; the other, not to provide aid and thus to keep their hands clean of the 
government’s unsavory policies, but at the cost of thousands of civilian lives.”34 In order to 
follow geo-political relations and to ensure political correctness, should potentially innocent 
civilians be sacrificed? Such was the case when denying humanitarian relief to displaced 
Hutus in eastern DRC after the Rwandan genocide and such is the case when arguing against 
increased U.S. humanitarian relief to Palestinians living in Gaza. In 1999 even the World Food 
Program themselves commented in a report that “there is a difficult balance between the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and the implicit sanctioning of illegal action.” 35 
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However, this moral dilemma is over simplified and attempts to create a black and white 
dichotomy between right and wrong that does not exist.  
The simple fact that the Ugandan government could not keep Acholi civilians from 
returning to their villages before international humanitarian aid agencies flooded in to provide 
services to the IDP camps shows that humanitarian organizations did have some leverage to 
negotiate with when trying to assess the reality of the UPDF’s forced displacement military 
strategy. After deciding to enter northern Uganda and to begin providing food, sanitation, and 
water to the IDPs, relief agencies did not question the Ugandan government or the UPDF’s 
continued forced displacement policy. The UPDF continued their campaign for more than 
eight years after humanitarian groups came in, and little was done to push the Ugandan 
government on the effectiveness or necessity of this strategy. Therefore, humanitarian aid 
agencies’ option between not going in at all or going in and supporting IDPs but being 
complicit in the government’s illegal strategy was not an exhaustive list of choices. Rather, 
the international aid groups could have entered northern Uganda to help the Acholi population 
that was in dire need of support while simultaneously pressing the Ugandan government to 
reassess their forced displacement policy and pushing the government to allow civilians to 
return to their ancestral villages with humanitarian support.36 
6.3.3. What Can be Done Now? 
Although the conflict in northern Uganda has ended, the LRA has been pushed into 
neighboring countries, and the IDP camps have been dismantled since 2006-2007, many 
negative effects from the UPDF’s forced displacement campaign still reverberate throughout 
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the population. While much more could be done to support the northern Acholi population 
rebuild after their experiences with conflict, certain specific steps could be taken to move 
forward towards a more inclusive healing process that could ultimately result in lasting peace. 
In particular, humanitarian agencies should be more inclusive, all crimes committed in 
northern Uganda, including those perpetrated by the UPDF should be investigated, and the 
Ugandan government must acknowledge and apologize for the terrible consequences of its 
forced displacement military policy.  
First, humanitarian aid agencies must become more inclusive in supporting the Acholi 
population rather than focusing exclusively on returned child soldiers. As described 
previously, many humanitarian organizations operating in northern Uganda after the conflict 
and after the dismantlement of the IDP camps focus on providing their services to returned 
child soldiers. While supporting returned abductees who have suffered severe physical and 
psychological trauma is obviously not to be criticized, it is important to point out that those 
returning from the bush are not the only survivors of this northern war. Those individuals who 
spent up to a decade living in harsh IDP camp conditions suffered during the conflict as well, 
albeit in different ways, and should not be forgotten or marginalized simply because they are 
not official abductees. Therefore, to truly support Uganda’s northern Acholi region, 
humanitarian services must branch out to support all civilians without discrimination.  
Second, humanitarian organizations and foreign governments must investigate and expose 
all crimes committed in northern Uganda, including UPDF crimes committed and not just the 
LRA’s atrocities. The fact that humanitarian groups and foreign governments focus almost 
all, if not exclusively, of their attention on the LRA atrocities committed rather than on equally 
investigating and calling attention to the UPDF human rights abuses and crimes is unfair and 
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angers the Acholi community. In an interview with a formerly abducted girl child she noted, 
“It was worse when the UPDF ambushed us and we went into government custody. They 
accused us of being rebels since we had children by LRA soldiers and they treated us as 
such.”37 In the 2007 UC Berkeley Human Rights Center survey 70% of the respondents said 
the UPDF had committed war crimes and human rights abuse and 55% favored their 
prosecution.38 Unless the UPDF is equally investigated, anger and resentment will continue 
to brew across the country.  
Third, the Ugandan government must acknowledge the terrible consequences of its forced 
displacement military policy, apologize to the Acholi community, and work some 
compensation into the conflict resolution process to realize long-term sustainable peace. As 
noted before, much of the Acholi population carries resentment and anger over the UPDF’s 
forced displacement strategy and feel that they should receive some compensation from the 
government for their time spent living in IDP camps. The International Center for Transitional 
Justice’s 2011 field research in northern Uganda on memory and memorialization revealed 
that many Acholi believe the government’s forced displacement policy was “a deliberate 
policy of cultural and economic destruction.”39 Even a simple recognition of the negative 
consequences from this military tactic followed with an apology to the northern population 
would help quell the brooding resentment. With no recognition, apology, or compensation the 
tension between the north and the south in Uganda will only continue, making the long-term 
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outlook of a successful conflict resolution process look dim. LRA leader Joseph Kony himself 
claims that he refuses peace talks until the UPDF acknowledge crimes they committed.40 
When coupled with the Ugandan government’s continual lack of investment in northern 
Uganda and resistance to investigate the $12.7 million dollars that went missing in the Office 
of the Prime Minister reserved for northern post-war reconstruction, the failure to include 
forced displacement in the conflict resolution process could mean the ultimate failure of 
sustained national peace.41  
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VII.   Chapter Seven: Implications and Conclusions 
“There’s no way to peace; peace is the way.”  
                                                   –A.J. Muste. 
 
7.1. What Does all this Mean? 
Now that we have arrived at the beginning to the end it is important to reflect on and 
highlight key points made throughout previous chapters to understand how we got here. Why 
is all this information important and what can be done with the information extracted from the 
conflict in northern Uganda to shed light on other situations?  
7.1.1. How Did we get Here? 
To underscore again, the general questions that this study seeks to investigate are: What 
are some non-conventional issues present in conflict that must be addressed in order to 
realize long-term sustainable peace? What role does transitional justice, both at the local and 
international level, play in conflict resolution and peacebuilding? How can international 
actors work with local forces to respond in an effectively coordinated way to sexual and 
gender based violence, war crimes, and forced displacement? To begin to answer these 
questions each of the three substantive chapters highlighted a non-conventional issue present 
in conflict including SGBV, transitional justice, and displacement. Each of these three issues 
must be addressed by both local and international communities to ensure lasting and 
sustainable peace for Uganda.  
SGBV affects both males and females and is present throughout the world. However, 
regions and communities currently or recently experiencing conflict are especially vulnerable 
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to high SGBV rates. Chapter four highlighted the fact that SGBV was of serious concern in 
Uganda during the northern conflict between the LRA and the UPDF and it remains a serious 
concern throughout the country, and particularly in the North, today. During the northern war, 
both the LRA and the UPDF engaged in SGBV.  The chapter also explained that the LRA 
predominantly engaged in large scale abductions of women and girls to act as sex slaves while 
the UPDF predominantly engaged in rape amongst individuals living in IDP camps. Although 
violent conflict related to the war has been absent from northern Uganda since 2005, a 2014 
SGBV survey showed that 63% of female SGBV survey respondents had experienced 
violence in the home in the past 12 months. The Ugandan government has responded to SGBV 
in numerous ways, predominantly in the form of affirmative action in politics and education 
and the passing of relevant legislation. Additionally, international actors have responded, 
including conducting community sensitizations and organizing VSLA groups to reduce 
SGBV. While some success has been achieved, chapter four underscores that there are many 
shortcomings with domestic and international responses to SGBV in Uganda. The chapter 
concludes with three clear policy steps that could be taken to effectively reduce SGBV. These 
include (i) creating safe spaces for SGBV survivors, (ii) tackling corruption, and (iii) 
incorporating gender mainstreaming into all organizations and institutions. Without serious 
consideration of alleviating SGBV during conflict mitigation policies and peacebuilding, 
long-term sustainable peace will not be reached because negative consequences will permeate 
throughout the society long after the official conflict has ended.  
Chapter five discusses transitional justice as another issue present in conflict that must be 
fully and effectively addressed to realize sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is extremely 
important to long-term peace processes. How a nation or community embarks on its 
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peacebuilding process, including issues such as who is and is not included, affects long-term 
outcomes and whether sustainable peace can be realized. In Uganda’s case, the international 
community and the Ugandan government focused on DDR and ICC legal prosecutions for 
transitional justice while the local Acholi community and some NGOs pushed for more 
traditional justice mechanisms. The chapter highlighted that many shortcomings exist 
regarding the national DDR process and the five ICC LRA leader indictments. Problems 
include the government’s determination of what reintegration means and the ICC’s sole 
investigation into LRA crimes rather than also investigating UPDF crimes. Conversely, the 
chapter also discussed how many individuals promote traditional Acholi justice opposed to 
Western imposed notions of peace and justice. However, it was shown that while this sounds 
ideal at first glance, there are also many shortcomings associated with traditional Acholi 
justice. Chapter five concluded that when moving forward a mixture of local, national, and 
international level responses to transitional justice and peacebuilding is needed to create a 
holistic approach to realizing long-term sustainable peace. For example, while the Ugandan 
government’s national DDR approach is crucial for abductees continuing to return from the 
bush, a key policy recommendation made in chapter five is that (i) they should reevaluate their 
process of reintegration and reevaluate who qualifies for compensation to fully support 
individuals resettling back into society. Additionally, it was recommended that (ii) despite all 
its criticisms, the ICC’s LRA indictments should remain in place. However, the ICC should 
also investigate UPDF crimes committed to ensure fairness and justice. Finally, it was 
recommended that (iii) as there is no generalized consensus on the use of traditional Acholi 
justice for conflict resolution and reconciliation, it is important for each village and each 
community to independently determine what the necessary and ideal local practices are that 
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will help lead them to an inclusive peace. However, this must be done carefully so as not to 
reinstitutionalize harmful practices like forced marriage.   
Chapter six looks at displacement, the final issue present in conflict that this thesis 
discusses. Displacement at varying levels always occurs when violent conflict takes place, 
and in Uganda’s case at the war’s end in 2005 roughly 1.8 million northerners had been 
displaced from their ancestral homes.1 Chapter six showed that the Ugandan government’s 
forced displacement policy was as harmful as the war itself and contributed to the dire 
humanitarian situation in northern Uganda. This ensured lasting hardship for a whole 
population and thus made conflict resolution and successful long-lasting peace difficult to 
realize. Additionally, the chapter highlighted that the structure of humanitarian delivery 
contributed to the Ugandan State’s forced displacement policy. During northern Uganda’s 
IDP camp era, humanitarian organizations flooded in to provide much needed services. 
However, their assistance also made the Ugandan government’s forced displacement policy 
possible making the aid agencies complicit in the process. The chapter continues on to 
underscore displacement’s long-term negative consequences including increased alcoholism 
and high SGBV rates that are still present in northern Uganda today. Finally, the chapter looks 
at what could have been done differently during the war and looks at what can be done now 
to abate some of the negative consequences of displacement. Three main policy 
recommendations for the Ugandan government are offered: (i) acknowledge the terrible 
consequences of its forced displacement military policy, (ii) apologize to the northern 
Ugandan community, and (iii) work compensation into the conflict resolution process to 
realize long-term sustainable peace. 
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7.2. Peace in Central Africa Today 
While the active war in northern Uganda has ended, many negative side effects from the 
conflict still remain present and many of Uganda’s neighbors are currently experiencing active 
conflict. In particular, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), and South Sudan are all undergoing violent conflict. As each country works to 
quell the violence within its borders and works towards comprehensive conflict resolution, 
SGBV, transitional justice, and displacement must be integral components of the process if 
each are to realize long-term sustainable peace in the future.  
7.2.1. Central African Republic (CAR) 
CAR is a landlocked country in central Africa with a population of roughly 4.5 million.2 
The nation was a French colony and gained their independence August 13, 1960. It was ruled 
by various totalitarian leaders until their first democratic elections in 1993.3 Since the 1993 
elections the country has experienced numerous coups leaving CAR in a constant state of 
chaos and uncertainty, a prime environment for rebel militia groups to operate. For instance, 
the LRA is believed to have operated intermittently in CAR since 2008. 4 Most recently, 
former CAR President Francois Bozize, who came to power in a coup, was overthrown in 
March 2013 by the Seleka Coalition militia. However, the self-appointed President and Seleka 
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leader Michel Djotodia was forced to resign in 2014 and replaced by interim leader Catherine 
Samba-Panza.5 Within this turmoil, it is believed that the LRA still operates partly from CAR. 
The largest recent LRA defection occurred in December 2013 in CAR with nineteen rebel 
members surrendering.6 Additionally, the ongoing conflict in CAR is taking an increasingly 
sectarian and religious turn between Christian and Muslim groups. Various Christian militia 
groups, including the predominant anti-Balaka force, are fighting the predominantly Muslim 
Seleka rebel group and indiscriminate civilian killing is occurring on all sides. In April 2014 
French peacekeepers operating in CAR escorted a convoy of 102 civilian Muslims out of the 
nation’s capital, Bangui, where Christian militia groups were specifically targeting them. 7 
Since December 2013 200,000 people have fled the country seeking refuge and another 
160,000 more are expected to leave by the 2014 year’s end.8 
Transitional justice within the CAR context is an important aspect in the conflict that must 
be addressed and handled carefully while working to lessen the violence taking place. In 2007 
the ICC announced that it would begin investigating war crimes committed in 2002 and 2003 
following coup attempts against then leader Ange-Felix Patasse. The ICC found Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo responsible as military commander, on two counts of crimes against humanity 
and three counts of war crimes including murder, rape, and pillaging. 9 Additionally, four 
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others have been arrested and transferred to the Hague and are similarly accused of past war 
crimes. In February 2014 head ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced the launch of a 
preliminary investigation into potential war crimes in the most recent violent conflict in 
CAR 10  This announcement from the ICC offers the potential for positive international 
transitional justice leading to peace. However, it is crucial that the ICC remain balanced in 
their investigation and examine war crimes engaged in by all actors in CAR. Also, it is crucial 
for the interim CAR government themselves to address justice for all crimes committed during 
conflict and for local communities to determine what traditional justice mechanisms are 
important for them to move on and realize peace. If transitional justice is not carefully 
addressed in CAR’s peace process and if all sides are not investigated equally, resentment and 
hate between all conflicting parties will remain, thus making the nation’s potential for long-
term sustainable peace difficult to reach.  
7.2.2. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
The DRC is located in central Africa, is the second largest country in Africa by land mass, 
and has a population of roughly 66 million inhabitants.11 After a long and brutal colonial 
history administered first by Belgium’s King Leopold II and second by Belgium more 
generally, the DRC gained independence in 1960.12 After a CIA backed assassination, DRC’s 
first democratically elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was disposed and was followed 
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by U.S. backed brutal dictator Mobutu Sese Seko who renamed the country Zaire.13 Caught 
up in Cold War proxy conflict throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in the 1990s Rwanda invaded 
DRC’s eastern region to eradicate Hutu extremist militias responsible for the Rwandan 
genocide.14 This sparked an internal conflict which led to the ousting of Mobutu who was 
replaced by President Laurent Kabila and the renaming of Zaire to the DRC. However, conflict 
within the country continued as internal divisions became international as other sub-Saharan 
African countries including Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were pulled 
in to support various sides.15 Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and was replaced by his son, 
Joseph Kabila, who remains in power today. Conflict and violence in the country remain 
serious problems, particularly as the DRC government headquartered in the western capital 
Kinshasa has little to no control over the nation’s vast territory. For example, it is believed 
that more than twenty-five predominant rebel factions operate in just two eastern DRC 
provinces.16 Infrastructure and development also remain serious issues for this central African 
nation which includes the world’s second largest rain forest within its borders. Additionally, 
the LRA is thought to have some fighting faction holdouts operating in northeastern DRC in 
Garamba National Park where they are thought to be in hiding.17 
                                                        
13 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Patrice Lumumba: The Most Important Assassination of the 20th 
Century,” The Guardian, January 17, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination.   
 
14 “Democratic Republic of Congo Profile,” BBC News: Africa, March 11, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13283212. 
 
15 Ibid.   
 
16 Mark Doyle, “DR Congo’s Rebel Kaleidoscope,” BBC News: Africa, December 4, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20586792.   
 
17 Thibaud Lesueur, “Is the LRA Only Sleeping?” International Crisis Group, September 11, 2013, 
http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2013/09/11/is-the-lra-only-sleeping/.   
 135 
While SGBV, transitional justice, and displacement are all important in relation to conflict 
in DRC and building long-term peace, SGBV in DRC will be highlighted here. As mentioned 
in chapter four, DRC is noted as the most dangerous place in the world to be a woman as rape 
is used daily as a weapon of war.18 1,100 women are raped daily in the DRC and although the 
United Nations helped defeat one of the most predominant rebel militia groups, the M23, 
operating in the country’s eastern region in fall 2013, the situation remains tenuous.19 Human 
Rights Watch DRC researcher Ida Sawyer notes that the M23 defeat is a positive step. 
However, “it is by no means the end of Congo’s brutal story.”20 Sawyer reminds readers that 
the Congolese government and the UN must address the threat posed by other rebel militia 
groups including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Raia 
Mutomboki, and the Sheka’s militia who all engage in civilian attacks, murder, mutilation, 
cruel treatment, rape, torture, pillaging, and property destruction. 21  Additionally, Margot 
Wallstrom, former United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
called the DRC “the rape capital of the world” as rebel militia groups use rape to destroy 
bonds within communities to weaken society.22 Jocelyn Kelly, lead researcher at the Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative’s Gender-Based Violence Program explains that because SGBV 
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survivors are often rejected by their husbands, SGBV must be addressed to prevent societal 
destruction. 23  If SGBV is not addressed in the ongoing conflict in DRC, post-conflict 
reconstruction and development will remain difficult and communities will continue to 
experience many negative consequences resulting in further communal conflict. 
7.2.3. South Sudan 
South Sudan became the world’s most recently recognized country when it gained 
independence July 9, 2011.24 Located in east-central Africa, South Sudan is a landlocked 
country with a population of roughly 11 million.25 The country gained independence from its 
northern neighbor, Sudan, following one of Africa’s longest-running civil wars between the 
predominantly Muslim-Arab north and the predominantly Christian-African south. In the last 
part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the two parties in 2005, 
South Sudanese voted in January 2011 to become their own nation-state. The new country 
embarked on a journey of rapid political, social, and economic development led by President 
Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar. Controversy over border disputes, particularly in the 
Abyei region, and conflict over oil with Sudan have posed serious obstacles to South Sudan’s 
newly founded independence. Most recently, conflict has broken out between Kiir and his 
former deputy Machar, whom he dismissed from office in summer 2013. Kiir and his 
followers (mostly belonging to the Dinka ethnic group) and Machar and his followers (mostly 
belonging to the Nuer ethnic group) have been engaging in armed conflict with Kiir accusing 
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Machar of trying to stage a coup against his government. 26  The conflict has become 
increasingly bloody and violent. After a recent visit to South Sudan the UN High Commission 
for Human Rights (UNHCHR) chief Navi Pillay reported that more than 9,000 children had 
been illegally recruited as soldiers to fight in the breakout civil war.27 Both the South Sudanese 
army and the rebel forces have been accused of recruiting children and the country is 
additionally facing a serious famine threat. As Pillay highlights, “there was an ‘apparent lack 
of concern’ on the part of its leaders.”28 
Displacement is a crucial aspect in South Sudan’s conflict that must be addressed if the 
country hopes to one day realize long-term sustainable peace. Since the violent conflict broke 
out in December 2013 about one million individuals have been displaced from their homes.29 
While peace talks between the two sides have resumed in Ethiopia, the fighting continues in 
South Sudan and in April 2014 a mass killing of hundreds of civilians took place in the oil-
rich town of Bentiu.30 Additionally, as most South Sudanese individuals rely on agriculture 
for employment, further displacement poses a serious threat to both the nation’s food security 
and to individual’s overall livelihood. According to the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC), 3.7 million people are at immediate risk of extreme hunger and if displacement 
continues the number could rise to seven million.31 As explained in chapter six, displacement 
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itself can have just as severe, if not worse, long-term negative consequences as the direct 
conflict itself. Therefore, displacement must be in the forefront of peace talks and the conflict 
resolution process taking place in Ethiopia or the situation could tumble into further 
destruction. Emphasis must be placed on working to support the displaced population in 
returning to their homes and farms in preparation for the rainy season for individuals to begin 
their livelihood activities once again. Also, humanitarian organizations operating in South 
Sudan and international actors assisting in the Ethiopia peace talks must push to place 
displacement on the agenda as one of the most crucial issues to prevent further conflict and 
its negative consequences. 
 
7.3. What is Still Missing? 
This thesis has argued that SGBV, transitional justice, and displacement are three keys 
issues present in violent conflict that must be adequately addressed by both local and 
international communities to ensure lasting sustainable peace for the affected community. But 
what is still missing? How did the conflict in northern Uganda actually end and how was the 
LRA effectively pushed out of Uganda? Why does conflict regularly still occur in central 
Africa and why have various responses to it not succeeded in eradicating violence against 
innocent civilians? What would a more humane future for the region look like and how can it 
be achieved? While all of these questions cannot be easily and adequately answered, a further 
look at some final aspects of conflict in central Africa is necessary in order to conclude.  
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7.3.1. Conditions to End Conflict 
How was it possible to effectively push the LRA out of Uganda and end the conflict in the 
North? Many contributing factors and various influences affecting why the war ended in 
Uganda and a look at two important factors may shed light on the situations in nearby CAR, 
DRC, and South Sudan in order to work towards peace in the region. In particular, decreasing 
arms flow into conflict regions and working to reduce security vacuums that allow for easy 
rebel militia group operations would reduce the likelihood of continued violent conflict. 
One particular reason that the UPDF was able to push the LRA out of Uganda was the fact 
that after the CPA was signed in South Sudan it is believed that the Sudanese government in 
Khartoum then provided less support to the LRA. While some suspect that the LRA still 
receives support from Sudan, the amount they are receiving is likely less than before the 2005 
CPA.32 Once Khartoum was no longer supporting the LRA at the same levels, the UPDF had 
the clear military advantage with their American and African Union support. It is no 
coincidence that the same year the CPA was signed, the LRA were pushed out of northern 
Uganda. Therefore, in conflict it is crucial to determine where the financial and military 
support for rebel militia groups is coming from and to work towards ending that support. For 
example, this tactic was seemingly successful in regards to the M23 operating in eastern DRC. 
The M23 was receiving support from the Rwandan government, although Rwanda vehemently 
disputes this claim. When this information was exposed, coupled with increased United 
Nations military response, the M23 was defeated.33 To end conflict, it is vital to reduce arms 
flow that is fueling the violence.  
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Another factor that influenced the UPDF’s ability to push the LRA out of Uganda was the 
security vacuum that existed in neighboring countries. The UPDF were able to drive the LRA 
out because they had neighboring countries with ungoverned space where they could push 
them to. All three countries that the LRA were operating in and inhabiting when they left 
Uganda, CAR, DRC, and South Sudan, lack the ability to tackle the LRA on their own and 
lack the ability to prevent the rebel militia group from entering and maintaining operations 
within their borders. If CAR, DRC, and South Sudan had stronger governments or stronger 
militaries, the UPDF would not have been able to drive the LRA into their territory. For 
example, it is no coincidence that the LRA have been operating in CAR, DRC, and South 
Sudan rather than in Uganda’s neighboring Kenya. Although Kenya has its own issues, their 
stronger State and military most likely would have been capable of preventing the LRA from 
being pushed into its borders. Security vacuums in nearby countries are an unfortunate 
condition for reducing conflict because while it ends conflict in one country, it simply shifts 
the conflict elsewhere. Therefore, working to build strong institutions within State structures 
and continuing to institute monopolies of force within nation-states to reduce security 
vacuums in the first place will reduce violent conflict. Had Uganda’s nearby countries not had 
security vacuums and had they had stronger governments and militaries, the LRA would not 
have been able to cross over the border and continue to operate to this day, the UPDF would 
have been responsible for defeating them within their own territory.  
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7.3.2. A Necessary Shift to Positive Peace 
The traditional and long-standing peace perspective known as negative peace is defined 
as the absence of war and other direct violent conflict.34 Due to this, war analysis and conflict 
resolution is often focused on any means possible to end violence. This makes logical sense 
on the surface: to bring peace to a region, violence must end as quickly and fully as possible. 
However, the immediate violence is almost always never the full story of the unfortunate 
situation at hand. Other factors are also present besides the direct violence that must be 
addressed or conflict could easily break out again. Therefore, if the focus remains on achieving 
negative peace, there is less potential for long-term peace to be realized. Rather, a necessary 
shift towards positive peace, defined as the presence or promotion of social justice which 
requires not only the absence of war but also requires the protection of human rights, is 
required to reach sustainable peace.35 
During the war in northern Uganda, the Ugandan government focused on achieving 
negative rather than positive peace. Rather than think about whether their military policies 
promoted social justice and protected human rights, they acted with the sole purpose of 
eradicating the LRA and ending the violent conflict—although this is also debatable 
considering previously mentioned evidence that the UPDF knew of LRA attacks on civilians 
and did nothing to prevent it. Not only did their tactics take over twenty years to fully push 
the LRA out of Uganda, but they did not fully eradicate the LRA. Also, more harm was caused 
than necessary due to their policies, as seen with their forced displacement policy and 
engagement in SGBV. Had the Ugandan government strove for positive rather than negative 
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peace in the first place, there would be a greater likelihood that long-term negative 
consequences from SGBV and forced displacement would not have occurred. Additionally, 
to this day the Ugandan military, supported by the US government and the African Union, 
and some international NGOs remain focused on achieving negative rather than positive peace 
regarding the LRA operating in neighboring countries. For example, the Bridgeway 
Foundation, a charitable organization headquartered in Texas, works directly with the 
Ugandan military and hired private military contractors to help train the army in their search 
for the LRA in CAR, DRC, and South Sudan.36 Bridgeway Foundation’s CEO, Shannon 
Davis, most likely has good intentions. However, this militaristic approach which includes 
hiring private military contractor Eeben Barlow who previously founded Executive 
Outcomes, a private military security firm with a history of controversial action in sub-
Saharan Africa, is a direct result of focusing too heavily on negative peace.37 In an interview 
with a representative from the U.S. Embassy in Kampala one clearly frustrated person noted, 
“There is something fundamentally missing from attempts at conflict resolution and conflict 
mitigation from Uganda to Afghanistan. I don’t know what it is, but we’re clearly missing 
something.”38 Focus on conflict mitigation is too focused on military action and thus too 
focused on negative peace, positive peace is what is missing from the conflict mitigation 
puzzle. 
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Those who argue for peaceful responses to conflict mitigation are often criticized as being 
too “utopian” and are quickly discounted as unrealistic.39 In American society today military 
patriotism and romanticism are everywhere and antimilitarist arguments are painted as weak 
or promoters of some sort of socialistic equilibrium.40 However, this is not the case. Promoting 
and arguing for positive peace need not be utopian or even pacifist. Rather, focusing on 
positive rather than negative peace provides a more comprehensive approach to conflict 
mitigation and conflict resolution that is required to ensure long-term peace. This thesis has 
highlighted three serious issues in war: SGBV, transitional justice, and displacement, and the 
long-term negative consequences that result from not addressing them. Each of these issues 
cannot be adequately addressed when only trying to achieve negative peace. However, 
positive peace, with its focus on protecting human rights and promoting social justice while 
also working to eradicate violent conflict, can address SGBV, transitional justice, and 
displacement.   
7.3.3. Towards a More Humane Future 
Researchers and scholars work to address conflict resolution, although unfortunately 
most fall short of presenting adequate solutions for crisis mitigation. I have argued in this 
thesis that there must be a shift from focusing on negative to positive peace which would 
adequately address SGBV, transitional justice, and displacement in order to achieve long-
term sustainable peace. This is necessary in the short-run to mitigate and prevent further 
conflict occurring in the immediate future. However, what is truly needed to end large scale 
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brutality is a restructuring of the world system to reflect Charles Taylor’s theory of an 
emerging new global social imaginary. This would lead to a more equitable power 
distribution capable of addressing mass atrocities.  
Some argue that an American-led international order exercised within a system of rules 
is what global governance should look like and that this unilateral world domination would 
maintain the ability to prevent mass atrocity.41 For example, John Ikenberry notes that “the 
more rules-based order is, the more legitimate it is likely to be” and he calls for stronger 
international institutions to create a predictable international environment.42 However, while 
American-led interventions through international institutions to stop massacres seems noble 
at face value, numerous problems are associated with this thinking. To begin with, it can be 
criticized as neo-colonial and imperialist in its undertakings. United States-led interventions, 
and Western-led interventions more generally, are often framed as developed countries 
acting as white knights to save helpless developing countries in conflict. This scenario 
denies agency to populations experiencing conflict and disallows them to address the 
situation in their own terms. Additionally, despite the consent of international institutions, 
any intervention is rarely exercised without regard to the self-interests of United Nations 
Security Council members. An example of this is the United States-led intervention in 
Libya. Protecting Libya’s people from potential genocide was used as legal, moral, political, 
and military justification for the NATO intervention that had United Nations Security 
Council support. However, it can also be strongly argued that self-interest in terms of access 
to oil played a larger role in intervening in Libya than did a responsibility to protect. This 
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discrepancy becomes evident through a comparison of similar crises where intervention did 
not take place, such as in Yemen, Bahrain, and Côte d'Ivoire.  
Additionally, to neocolonial, imperialist, and self-interest critiques of an American-led 
international order for intervention, it can be said that it ignores the role of non-state actors. 
The state-centric argument is premised on the notion that the international rule based order 
was created to operate in the Westphalian system. However, “the Westphalian discourse 
seems outmoded, or at the very least, in need of being enlarged to take into account some 
post-Westphalian perspectives.”43 Non-governmental organizations, transnational 
corporations, and non-state combatants all operate in the international system. However, 
they are not party to international law because they exist outside of the state apparatus. 
Because of this, “traditional political canons anchored in the nation-state and its domestic 
jurisdiction are increasingly perceived as insufficient.”44 As such, the argument for increased 
American-led global order through international law and institutions cannot address non-
state actors, as they cannot be held accountable in that framework. For example, the ICC 
may be seen as an international institution created to enforce international laws regarding 
crimes against humanity. Albeit well intentioned, as discussed previously this court has at 
times failed in its duties because of its inability to address non-state actors such as the LRA.  
Contrary to this American-led liberal hegemonic approach to global governance is a 
cosmopolitan approach. A cosmopolitan approach urges cosmopolitan law-enforcement 
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where the goal is the prevention of mass atrocities rather than enemy defeat.45 Current 
conflict resolution and atrocity prevention approaches are failing because they tackle new 
wars using old war techniques including official negotiations between leaders, and military 
intervention on one side or the other when today’s conflicts are more complex. While top-
down diplomacy approaches to attempt a negotiated solution between warring parties is at 
times necessary, it needs “to take place in a context where alternative non-exclusive political 
constituencies can be fostered” with the role of civil society as local cosmopolitan 
advocates.46 Due to the fact that at this juncture in time a world government is unrealistic 
and undesirable to most, a cosmopolitan global governance to help prevent and stop mass 
atrocities can only be attained imaginatively.47 According to Charles Taylor, a social 
imaginary is a commonly shared understanding of not only how things go, but also how 
things are supposed to go in the collective life of a community.48 Over the course of history, 
the social imaginary shapes collective understanding by becoming integrated into 
community practices where civil society is linked to an economy, can access a public 
sphere, and exists in a world of independent associations.49 For example, when 
understanding a community’s moral order, a sketch of society becomes an aggregate of 
individuals bound together by mutual benefit relations, including security and economic 
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prosperity and characterized by equality among all.50 Therefore, if implemented at a global 
level, it could create a framework for the way all individuals should act.  
To sufficiently prevent and end mass atrocities a new global social imaginary is needed 
that includes a world vision where individuals do not engage in extreme forms of violence: 
“a global imaginary responsive to 21st century beliefs, behavioral patterns, and 
aspirations.”51 Social imaginaries shift over time and are characterized by three key cultural 
forms including the economy, the public sphere, and modern citizenship states. Each of 
these three forms are becoming increasingly global and it is therefore not unfathomable to 
envisage a new global social imaginary forming.52 With this in mind, it is then possible to 
imagine a horizontal society, rather than the present system based on vertical hierarchies, 
where mass atrocities and colossal civilian casualties will end. The problem arises when the 
rights of power are implemented rather than the power of rights.53 The rights of power are 
seen when vertical hierarchies selectively choose where and where not to implement rights. 
For example, as seen by the United States’ adherence to liberal democratic norms and 
advocacy of human rights, but simultaneously choosing to ignore “the massive suffering that 
is befalling the 1.5 million people of Gaza.”54 Therefore, the new global social imaginary 
must envision a world in which the power of rights is advocated for by civil society where 
rights are truly extended to all global citizens.  
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Steps towards realizing this new horizontal society can begin by restructuring 
international institutions. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), charged with the 
maintenance of international security and peace, consists of five permanent veto power 
members and it must be renegotiated. Non-permanent members including Japan, Germany, 
Brazil, India, and South Africa are already demanding the UNSC to be restructured to 
represent more horizontal rather than vertical representations of power. Ideally, this new 
composition should include one member from each world region, with various represented 
countries rotating every other year. Additionally, veto power should be eliminated and votes 
would be based on a simple majority rather than a super majority, to ensure no minority 
alliance of powers could collaborate to block a vote. Decisions of international conflict 
mitigation and atrocity prevention would be left to this newly reformed UNSC and it would 
be left up to its members to determine actions towards violence alleviation.  
What is truly needed to address mass atrocity prevention and termination is a new global 
social imaginary, stemming from Charles Taylor’s ideas and based on horizontal egalitarian 
principles and true recognition of the power of rights. Egalitarian principles and the rights of 
all must be addressed because “unless the emergence of an effective form of global 
governance is adequately democratized it [would] only reproduce existing acute inequalities 
and exploitative patterns of the present world order.”55 While this may seem utopian at 
present, utopian ideas are necessary. They represent the fundamental ability to envision a 
better world, providing inspiration to individuals seeking change and providing an alternate 
global paradigm. Utopian ideas are essential to determine what change needs to occur as 
reform can then follow in its wake to actualize that change. 
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